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1 Introduction	
The	world	has	gone	digital.	In	developed	information	societies,	such	as	Finland,	this	is	
a	fact	so	profound	that	without	functioning	data	networks	and	computer	systems	the	
well-being	of	humans	and	even	the	security	of	the	nation	is	at	risk.		
In	this	complex	world	where	the	boundaries	of	the	digitalized	infrastructure	and	the	
physical	realm	are	blurred	the	interconnected	environment	of	physical	and	electrical	
systems	is	often	described	as	cyber	domain.	Cyber	domain	is	defined	in	the	Finnish	
cyber	security	strategy	as	a	domain	of	information	technology	infrastructures	pro-
cessing	data.	(Secretariat	of	the	Security	Committee	2013,	12)	
In	today’s	world	where	cyber	domain	is	an	integral	part	of	people’s	lives,	the	need	
for	training	against	different	types	of	cyber	related	threats	is	ever	growing.	JAMK	
University	of	Applied	Sciences	has	arranged	a	vast	number	of	different	types	of	cyber	
trainings.	The	training	against	threats	should	take	place	in	controlled	environment	
because	there	is	a	need	for	realistic	simulated	attacks,	and	the	risks	for	breaking	laws	
or	harming	outsiders	by	making	mistakes	in	the	open	internet	are	simply	put	too	big	
and	actual.	Also,	not	many	organizations	are	willing	to	take	the	risks	of	harming	their	
production	environment	or	continuity	of	business.	
For	this	purpose,	the	cyber	security	exercises	are	held	in	closed	cyber	ranges	isolated	
from	the	internet;	however,	they	mimic	the	services	and	structures	of	the	real	inter-
net.	Nevertheless,	it	makes	no	difference	if	one	is	training	in	simulations	or	struggling	
with	real	Cyber	Security	incidents	in	one’s	production	systems,	the	need	for	accurate	
situational	awareness	is	always	paramount.		
Situational	awareness	can	mean	a	variety	of	things	to	different	people.		People	also	
have	many	types	of	comprehensions	about	the	situational	awareness.	Therefore,	
there	is	a	need	to	define	what	it	means	in	the	context	of	this	thesis.		
Many	times,	to	be	able	to	resolve	a	cyber	security	incident	there	is	a	need	to	know	
what	happened,	where	it	happened,	when	it	happened,	why	it	happened	and	to	
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whom	it	happened.	There	are	several	systems	sold	and	advertised	as	situational	
awareness	systems.	These	vary	from	infrastructure	monitor	systems	to	log	manage-
ment	systems	and	even	to	ticketing	platforms.	These	systems	are	crucial	tools	for	in-
formation	gathering	for	incident	handling;	however,	the	problem	is	that	when	com-
plex	decisions	need	to	be	made	for	solving	cyber	security	incidents,	most	of	the	infor-
mation	is	processed	in	the	human	heads.		
There	is	a	clear	need	for	a	system	that	gathers	pieces	of	information	so	that	the	inci-
dent	handler	can	make	rational	decisions	faster	and	focus	on	the	relevant	tasks.	In	
many	cyber	security	exercises,	the	situation	gets	hectic	and	any	system	that	helps	in	
prioritization	would	be	useful	for	the	defending	team.	
The	theoretical	background	for	this	thesis	is	based	on	a	research	on	cyber	security	
situational	awareness,	requirements	management	and	cyber	security	exercises.	
The	outcome	of	this	thesis	can	be	used	as	a	high-level	requirement	specification	for	a	
cyber	security	situational	awareness	system	for	the	defender	in	cyber	security	exer-
cises.	It	should	be	possible	to	design	and	develop	a	demonstration	system	that	visu-
alizes	and	helps	in	understanding	what	the	current	overall	cyber	security	status	and	
situation	of	incident	handling	is	for	a	defending	team.	
This	thesis	is	assigned	by	JYVSECTEC	(Jyväskylä	Security	Technology).	JYVSECTEC	is	an	
independent	cyber	security	research,	training	and	development	center	within	JAMK	
University	of	Applied	Sciences,	the	Institute	of	Information	Technology.	JYVSECTEC	
arranges	cyber	exercises	of	various	types	and	sizes,	and	the	purpose	of	this	thesis	is	
to	advance	the	research	of	SA	(Situational	Awareness)	in	cyber	exercises.	(JYVSECTEC	
2017)	
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2 Research	
2.1 Research	objectives	
In	this	thesis,	the	situational	awareness	of	cyber	security	exercise	team	is	studied.	
Situational	awareness	in	exercise	covers	the	aspect	of	reporting	team	actions	in	the	
course	of	an	exercise.	This	means	that	team	reports	and	understands	the	actions	
they	make	in	exercise	along	with	the	more	obvious	technical	findings.	Thesis	explains	
why	there	is	a	need	for	a	new	situational	awareness	system	construction.	
The	objective	of	this	thesis	is	to	create	a	requirement	specification	document	for	a	
cyber	security	situational	awareness	system.	The	designed	situational	awareness	sys-
tem	described	here	could	be	used	in	cyber	security	exercises	by	a	team	responsible	
for	defending	technical	cyber	environments	against	various	types	of	cyber	security	
threats.	Hence,	the	definition,	a	defender’s	approach,	in	the	subtitle	of	the	thesis.	
There	is	a	vast	number	of	systems	and	platforms	available	marketed	as	situational	
awareness	systems	on	the	market	today.	Because	almost	any	type	of	visualization	or	
log	management	software	enhances	the	awareness	of	the	situation	in	computer	sys-
tem	environments	the	use	of	situational	awareness	terminology	in	marketing	is	valid.	
Complexity	of	situational	awareness	illustrates	why	there	are	many	ways	to	use	the	
term.	Definition	and	context	related	to	thesis	is	explained.	
Systems	or	platforms	specifically	designed	for	the	cyber	security	exercise	usage	in	
mind	are	non-existent	or	at	least	none	were	available	at	the	time	of	writing	this	the-
sis.	Therefore,	the	need	for	this	research	is	justified.	
2.2 Research	methodology	
Gordana	(2010)	stated	that	constructive	methodology	is	a	suitable	research	method	
to	be	used	in	software	engineering	theses.	Not	all	relevant	firsthand	knowledge	is	
usually	presented	when	referring	to	more	fundamental	approaches	such	as	empirical	
method,	grounded	theory	etc.	Therefore,	a	method	of	constructive	approach	is	
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needed.	Characterization	of	a	constructive	method	and	its	relation	to	the	more	fun-
damental	research	methodologies.	(Gordana	2010,	1)	
Gordana	(2001,	1)	also	refers	to	what	Lazaro	and	Marcos	(2005)	stated,	that	in	the	
field	of	computing,	the	engineering	research	differs	greatly	from	traditional	scientific	
approaches	as	engineering	focuses	on	how	a	thing	is	created	and	how	it	works	in-
stead	of	metaphysical	issues.	(Lazaro	&	Marcos	2005,	3)	
The	constructive	research	method	should	aim	at	solving	practical	problems	via	a	pro-
cess	of	selecting	a	problem,	obtaining	knowledge	about	area	and	designing	a	solu-
tion.	When	there	are	existing	theories	and	practical	problems,	the	gap	shows	poten-
tial	for	a	contribution	to	constructive	research.	(Lehtiranta	et	al.	2015,	1)	
Constructive	research	can	be	considered	as	a	type	of	applied	studies	as	production	of	
new	knowledge	is	characteristic	to	it.	This	aspect	suits	well	into	thesis	done	for	uni-
versity	of	applied	sciences.	(Kasanen	et	al.	1995,	252)	
Kasanen	et	al.	(1993,	247)	introduced	a	model	with	four	elements	that	should	be	in-
cluded	in	constructive	research.	These	are	shown	in	Figure	1	with	the	construction	in	
the	center	as	the	final	solution.	
	
Figure	1	Elements	of	Constructive	Research	(Kasanen	et	al.	1993,	247)	
Practical	relevance	to	this	thesis	comes	from	the	need	what	JYVSECTEC	(JYVSECTEC	
2017)	has	found	out	in	few	years	of	running	cyber	exercises.	Blue	teams	often	report	
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that	they	had	difficulties	in	understanding	the	situation	and	don’t	remember	the	ac-
tions	they	made.	There	is	a	real	world	need	for	a	new	situation	awareness	system	to	
be	used	in	cyber	exercises	and	with	features	that	are	not	found	in	the	market.	Many	
different	systems	are	used	separately	in	exercises	to	accomplish	the	tasks	covered	by	
this	thesis.	
Practical	functioning	is	the	problematic	issue	in	this	kind	of	approach	and	is	stated	to	
be	so	also	by	Kasanen	et	al.	(1993,	246)	in	their	research.	The	main	problem	lies	in	
understanding	the	fact	that	the	actual	functioning	of	a	problem-solving	construction	
can	often	be	found	only	after	the	construction	is	actually	implemented.	This	is	not	
even	in	the	scope	of	this	thesis	so	this	research	method	fails	in	this	area.	
Theoretical	connection	to	research	comes	from	literature	regarding	situational	
awareness	and	cyber	security	exercise	research.	Reflecting	these	with	authors	sev-
eral	years	of	practical	experience	from	many	different	exercises	it	is	easy	to	under-
stand	that	theoretical	literature	is	not	focusing	into	the	dilemma	of	blue	team	situa-
tional	awareness.		
According	to	a	study	consisting	of	102	scientific	articles	by	Franke	and	Brynielsson	
(2014)	Theoretical	research	of	cyber	situational	awareness	is	focusing	more	towards	
data	analytic,	data	fusion	and	to	answer	to	the	cyber	threats	by	technical	means.	
(Franke	&	Brynielsson	2014,	26-27)	
When	cyber	exercises	are	studied	the	research	and	literature	found	is	focusing	on	
covering	different	aspects	that	need	to	be	taken	into	account	when	designing	and	
conducting	exercises	but	doesn’t	really	focus	on	team	performance	in	exercises.	
This	thesis	contributes	into	theoretical	research	by	examining	the	team	situational	
awareness	and	identifying	the	need	for	a	novel	construction	and	the	requirements	to	
develop	such	a	construction.	
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2.3 Research	questions	
Because	of	the	massive	amount	of	data	in	complex	ICT	environments	and	many	dif-
ferent	computer	systems	for	displaying	and	analyzing	information	are	available	as	sit-
uational	awareness	systems,	but	fail	to	address	the	needs	of	a	cyber	exercise,	the	re-
search	for	novel	system	design	should	be	performed.	Research	should	show	that	re-
quirements	and	construction	for	a	system	with	said	needs	can	be	found.		
Another	problem	lies	in	the	vast	variety	of	answers	to	the	question	what	situational	
awareness	is.	When	specified	into	a	more	detailed	area	of	cyber	security	situational	
awareness,	there	are	basically	as	many	answers	as	there	are	people	answering.	If	any	
definitions	or	new	research	topics	for	blue	team	situational	awareness	in	cyber	secu-
rity	exercise	can	be	found	it	should	be	stated	and	some	new	research	information	
should	be	presented.	
New	research	and	solutions	in	the	field	of	situational	awareness	is	a	product	of	
JYVSECTEC	project	and	there	is	also	the	need	to	find	out	aspects	of	situational	aware-
ness	that	might	need	further	research.	
The	questions	that	are	the	drivers	for	this	thesis	can	be	summarized	as:	
• What	are	the	requirements	for	a	defending	team	situational	awareness	system	
	
• What	kind	of	framework	construction	can	be	proposed	
		
• What	research	there	is	for	a	situational	awareness	in	cyber	exercises?	
	
Any	additional	findings	should	be	reported	and	at	the	minimum	be	listed	in	the	con-
clusion	to	be	proposed	as	a	future	research	possibilities.	
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3 Requirements	specification		
3.1 Fundamentals	of	requirement	specification	in	software	engineering	
In	this	chapter,	some	key	elements	of	a	software	project’s	requirement	specifications	
are	studied	to	gain	a	good	understanding	of	how	and	why	this	process	is	fundamen-
tal	when	developing	software	products.	
According	to	well	respected	source	literature	SWEBOK	(Software	Engineering	Body	of	
Knowledge),	the	software	requirement	is	stated	as	a	property	that	should	solve	a	
real-world	problem.	(Bourque	&	Fairley	2014,	33-34)	
Software	requirement	management	means	the	analysis	and	validation	of	require-
ments	throughout	the	life	cycle	of	product.	Projects	are	critically	vulnerable	if	re-
quirement	management	is	not	done	effectively.	(Bourque	&	Fairley	2014,	32)	
SWEBOK	(2014,	34)	also	defines	an	example	that	a	solution	may	aim	at	automation	
of	a	task	or	at	supporting	a	business	process;	however,	since	these	function	in	a	com-
plex	manner,	the	requirements	are	also	typically	complex	combinations	from	various	
people	from	multiple	levels	of	an	organization.	(Bourque	&	Fairley	34)	
When	later	in	this	thesis	the	situational	awareness	is	defined,	it	is	quite	obvious	that	
without	a	quite	strict	and	limited	first	approach	to	requirement	specification	work,	
there	will	be	such	a	vast	number	of	complexity	that	it	would	become	an	overwhelm-
ing	task	to	start.	Hence,	only	key	requirements	at	somewhat	abstract	level	would	be	
feasible.	
When	defining	the	requirement	work	for	a	software	project,	there	should	be	a	clear	
understanding	about	the	proposed	requirement	handling	model.	
		
15	
3.2 Requirement	handling	in	software	development	
It	is	not	really	a	relevant	part	of	this	thesis	to	define	requirement	handling;	however,	
it	helps	in	limiting	the	scope	and	aids	with	understanding	why	it	might	seem	that	
some	interesting	elements	are	not	taken	into	account	when	requirements	are	cho-
sen.	
As	the	organization	that	assigned	this	thesis	is	a	university	and	not	a	software	com-
pany,	it	is	quite	common	to	experiment	and	try	new	methods.	The	ultimate	goal	
might	not	be	a	commercial	software	to	be	sold	but	the	aim	is	to	study	possible	ap-
proaches	to	a	certain	dilemma.	
Therefore,	too	strict	guidelines	might	actually	limit	the	possibilities.	In	this	type	of	
work	the	more	agile,	fast	and	flexible	methods	tend	to	work	the	best.	If	the	idea	had	
been	a	software	project	that	experiments	and	evolves	into	actual	code,	it	would	have	
been	possible	to	use	the	agile	development	method.	
The	agile	approach	illustrated	in	Figure	2	considers	design	and	implementation	as	
central	activities.	It	incorporates	other	activities,	such	as	elicitation	of	requirements	
and	testing	of	implementation	into	design	and	implementation	according	to	Som-
merville	in	Software	Engineering	book.	(Sommerville	2011,	62)	
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Figure	2	Agile	process	(Sommerville	2011,	63)	
As	this	thesis	aims	more	at	being	a	study	and	defining	a	new	idea	in	the	field	of	situa-
tional	awareness	rather	than	creating	an	actual	software	product	work,	the	agile	de-
velopment	process	was	not	the	best	suitable	option.	It	must	be	stated	that	require-
ments	for	such	an	agile	project	can	be	found	as	requested.	
When	it	comes	to	requirement	handling	in	this	project,	the	author	has	used	plan-
based	development	specification	process	as	this	seamed	well	suited	for	this	work.	
As	stated	by	Sommerville	(2011,	62-63),	in	the	plan-driven	approach	that	is	illus-
trated	in	Figure	3	the	iteration	occurs	within	activities	themselves.	Each	function	iter-
ates	into	formal	documents	that	are	passed	between	different	process	stages.	There-
fore,	the	requirement	engineering	takes	place	first,	and	the	refinement	of	this	phase	
leads	to	actual	requirement	specification.	The	work	done	for	this	thesis	can	be	con-
sidered	as	a	requirement	engineering	phase	and	at	the	same	time	this	thesis	can	be	
considered	as	the	actual	requirement	specification.	Though	it	must	be	stated	that	
there	are	more	thesis	related	research	issues	written	than	would	be	necessary	in	a	
commercial	project.	
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Figure	3	Plan-Based	Development	(Sommerville	2011,	63)	
This	plan-based	model	is	suitable	for	this	type	of	thesis	work.	It	helps	in	defining	the	
scope	of	the	thesis	more	strictly	than	agile	method;	however,	at	the	same	time	it	of-
fers	the	possibility	to	leave	out	the	design	and	implementation	part	which	is	not	in	
the	scope	of	the	thesis.	
3.3 Specification	in	software	development	
The	reasoning	behind	software	specification	work	lies	in	the	realization	that	this	pro-
cess	clarifies	the	understanding	and	helps	with	defining	what	parts	the	designed	sys-
tem	requires.	It	also	identifies	the	constraints	of	the	system	operations.	
Sommerville	also	states	the	obvious	understanding	that	the	requirements	process	is	
not	simply	carried	out	in	a	strict	sequence	of	actions.	The	requirement	analysis	needs	
to	continue	throughout	the	definition	and	specification	phases	as	new	requirements	
come	into	light	as	the	work	continues.	(Sommerville	2011,	38)	
Keeping	this	in	mind	there	is	a	point	in	time	where	it	is	mandatory	for	the	author	to	
freeze	the	process	of	adding	new	requirements	into	this	thesis.	It	is	obvious	that	
there	will	be	a	great	number	of	new	ideas	that	come	up	during	the	requirement	
specification	work,	which	leads	to	possible	future	development	opportunities.	
3.4 Requirement	categorization	
In	order	to	be	able	to	manage	requirements,	some	form	of	categorization	and	re-
quirement	format	needs	to	be	defined.		
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According	to	the	requirement	management	guide	of	the	Finnish	Defense	Forces,	
every	requirement	must	have	an	individual	identification	that	can	be	multi-layered.	If	
a	requirement	contains	multiple	issues,	they	should	be	divided	into	sub	require-
ments.	Also,	there	is	a	rule	that	identifications	must	be	unique	and	the	ID	must	not	
be	duplicated.	(Kosola	2013,	7-8)		
Table	1	presents	a	model	that	the	author	has	developed	for	a	single	requirement	that	
is	suited	for	generating	the	system	construction	this	thesis.	Requirements	have	some	
key	attributes	that	are	defined.	
Table	1	Content	of	a	requirement	
CATEGORY	 INFORMATION	 ADDITIONAL	REMARKS	
REQ	ID	NUM	 Ex.	1.1.1	 Depending	on	the	category	numbering	might	change		
REQ	NAME	 Name	of	the	requirement	
Needs	to	be	such	that	its	func-
tionality	is	understood	from	the	
name			
DESC	 Description	 More	detailed	description	of	the	requirement	
REQ	
IMPORTANCE	 Importance	
Importance	value,	Mandatory,	
Important,	Necessary		
ACTION	 Action	type	 What	should	be	done	when	this	requirement	is	met	
TYPE	OF	
ACTION	
Textual	or	Numerical	infor-
mation	etc.	
There	could	be	also	more	ab-
stract	actions	than	value	inputs	
RELATION	TO	
OTHER	REQ	 REQ	ID	NUM	
ID	of	a	requirement	which	has	
relation	or	clarification		
	
Name	for	the	requirement	is	to	aid	reader	of	this	document	to	understand	quickly	
the	meaning	of	the	requirement.	
According	to	Kosola	(2013,	14)	description	for	a	requirement	is	free	textual	field	that	
describes	the	requirement	in	more	elaborate	details.	This	doesn’t	mean,	however,	
that	any	random	free	text	wording	is	therefore	a	requirement.	Requirement	needs	to	
define	precision	and	not	be	too	abstract.	
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The	requirements	in	this	thesis	have	true	relevance	to	the	problem,	which	is	why	
there	are	no	requirements	to	be	left	out	but	their	importance	should	be	taken	into	
consideration.	The	importance	level	of	a	requirement	is	also	derived	from	Kosola	and	
is	decided	to	be	three-leveled	with	mandatory,	important	and	necessary.	(Kosola	
2013,	15)	
Mandatory	requirements	are	such	that	they	shall	be	implemented	to	the	system	and	
cannot	be	overlooked	or	left	out	from	implementation.	Important	requirements	
should	be	implemented	but	are	not	vital	to	the	usage	of	the	system.	Necessary	re-
quirements	are	such	that	can	be	left	out	but	are	valuable	and	should	be	imple-
mented.	
Other	information	fields	in	the	requirement	model	are	more	or	less	additional	attrib-
utes	and	have	been	selected	by	the	author	in	order	to	help	understand	the	construc-
tion	that	is	formed	based	on	the	requirements.	
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4 Cyber	security	exercises	and	the	infrastructure	in	JAMK	
4.1 Overview	of	core	exercise	types	
In	this	chapter,	some	key	exercise	types	are	covered.	There	is	a	vast	number	of	differ-
ent	kinds	of	exercises	that	could	be	used	when	learning	about	cyber	security	threats	
and	about	the	ways	of	handling	different	kind	of	incidents.	
When	looking	for	information	about	how	to	conduct	such	an	exercise,	a	book	from	
MITRE	comes	up	as	an	industry	baseline	for	exercise	building.	Also,	the	rough	catego-
rization	of	different	exercise	types	can	be	found	in	the	cyber	exercise	playbook	pub-
lished	by	the	MITRE	organization.	It	states	the	core	types	to	be	Table	Top,	Hybrid	
(scripted	injects	with	real	probes/scans)	and	full	live	(real	and	scripted).	(Kick	2014,	8)	
In	JAMK	JYVSECTEC,	the	cyber	exercises	are	categorized	according	to	the	business	
model.	MITRE	categories	are	also	valid	for	JAMK	business	cases	and	they	will	be	re-
flected	on	when	briefly	going	through.	They	have	been	named	so	that	they	will	be	
more	elaborate	to	customers.		
In	JYVSECTEC	cyber	range,	RGCE	and	solutions	whitepaper,	the	main	exercise	types	
offered	are	named	as	Digital	Forensics	and	Incident	Response	(DFIR)	exercise,	Indus-
try	sector	exercise	and	tailored	cyber	exercise.	(Vatanen	et	al.	2017,	13-15)	
JAMK	exercises	are	reflected	on	their	MITRE	counterparts	when	defining	the	exer-
cises	via	the	MITRE	categorization.	
4.2 Table	top	exercise	
Table	top	exercise	has	scripted	events	and	is	often	the	first	type	of	exercise.	Table	
top	exercises	do	not	take	too	long	time	to	plan	and	need	limited	resources.	This	is	a	
common	exercise	type	that	is	well	suited	for	playing	the	scenarios	for	the	decision-
making	level	attendees.	The	planners	and	players	usually	sit	at	same	table,	and	the	
injects	are	hypothetical,	pre-coordinated	and	written	down.	This	exercise	is	often	
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used	to	build	relationships	share	information	between	different	organizations.	They	
should	not	be	too	big	and	should	offer	a	room	for	discussions.	(Kick	2014,	9)	
At	JAMK	JYVSECTEC,	table	top	exercises	are	usually	not	hosted.	The	focus	and	the	
business	model	is	aimed	more	at	technical	and	operational	levels.	However,	in	some	
occasions,	a	table	top	approach	has	been	selected	in	unison	with	technical-opera-
tional	exercise	with	company	executives,	which	has	been	a	really	good	way	of	inte-
grating	two	different	types	of	exercises.	
4.3 Hybrid	exercise	
Hybrid	exercises	include	scripted	injects	and	real	probes	or	scans,	which	increase	the	
realism	and	training	opportunities.	There	should	be	a	red	team	that	generates	real	
events	against	pre-determined	targets.	Coordination	and	planning	takes	longer	as	
training	also	simulates	business	processes.	This	type	of	exercise	could	be	considered	
as	a	“walking”	as	there	is	a	pre-determined	course	of	actions.	(Kick	2014,	10)	
In	JAMK	exercise,	the	digital	forensic	and	incident	response	could	be	considered	as	a	
variant	of	this	MITRE	hybrid	exercise	definition.		In	DFIR	exercise,	the	scripted	events	
are	real	and	conducted	by	red	team	(RT)	members.	The	exercise	itself	is	not	live	ac-
tion	but	more	of	a	walkthrough	of	the	occurred	incident	and	helps	in	raising	aware-
ness	of	the	modern	attack	vectors	and	tactics.	At	the	same	time,	the	trained	organi-
zation	is	able	to	understand	the	process	of	incident	response	and	familiarize	them-
selves	with	the	forensic	artifacts	of	cyber	security	incidents.	
4.4 Full	live	exercise	
Full	live	exercises	are	based	on	real	events.	They	increase	the	realism	and	give	train-
ing	audience	a	great	opportunity	to	enhance	their	capabilities	to	counteract	if	and	
when	real	world	incidents	occur.	There	is	live	red	teaming	ongoing,	and	although	tar-
gets	and	procedures	are	mostly	scripted,	there	is	room	for	live	RT	actions	to	be	taken	
when	the	opportunity	opens.	Full	live	exercises	simulate	similar	conflictions	as	would	
occur	in	real	world	networks.	(Kick	2014,	10)	
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The	realism	in	a	full	live	exercise	is	the	determining	success	factor,	which	raises	the	
need	for	planners	to	understand	the	threats,	threat	actors,	their	objectives,	their	tac-
tics	and	procedures	(TTPs).	(Kick	2014,	11)	
Cyber	exercises	held	by	JYVSECTEC	are	mostly	live	exercise	variants.	They	are	held	in	
realistic	ready-made	complex	industry	organizations	or	in	fully	customized	and	
scoped	customer	organizations	running	in	the	Realistic	Global	Cyber	Environment	
(RGCE)	cyber	range	developed	just	for	this	purpose	in	mind.		
JAMK	exercises	are	always	held	in	an	isolated	cyber	range	environment;	however,	
MITRE	also	points	out	that	in	some	occasions	cyber	exercises	can	be	held	in	live	envi-
ronments	if	all	necessary	precautions	and	risks	are	taken	into	account.	JAMK	believes	
that	a	totally	isolated	environment	is	safer,	more	economical	and	makes	it	possible	
to	do	injects	that	would	not	be	feasible	in	production	environments.		
4.5 Exercise	team	definitions	
In	a	cyber	security	exercise,	there	is	a	common	pattern	of	defining	teams	by	colour.	
The	most	crucial	teams	for	live	exercises	are	white,	red	and	blue.	Other	colours	can	
be	used;	however,	these	are	must	have	teams.	The	basic	functions	for	teams	are	as	
follows:	white	is	plan/exercise	control,	red	team	is	attacker/adversary	and	blue	is	de-
fending	team.	The	green	team	is	the	most	crucial	team	because	they	are	responsible	
for	all	technical	issues	and	the	administration	of	cyber	range	and	possibly	facilitate	
some	injects	also	when	red	team	is	unable	to	do	so	according	to	limitations	in	infra-
structure.	
Definitions	vary	for	many	things	relating	to	cyber;	however,	quite	often	when	glossa-
ries	are	written	or	definitions	for	terminology	are	addressed,	namely	in	the	North	
American	literature	a	document	named	CSNNI	4009	(Committee	on	National	Security	
Systems	2010.)	by	the	committee	on	National	Security	Systems	comes	up.	Another	
good	source	for	definitions	is	CRIS	Cyber	Range	Lexicon	Version	1.0	(Damodaran	
2015.).	
		
23	
White	team	
Quite	often	the	white	team	is	mentioned	in	a	context	of	some	sort	of	competition.	
According	to	Committee	on	National	Security	Systems	(2010,	81),	the	white	team	is	
responsible	for	acting	as	a	referee	in	an	engagement	between	a	red	team	and	a	blue	
team.	In	an	exercise,	the	white	team	acts	as	the	judges,	enforces	the	rules	of	the	ex-
ercise,	observes	the	exercise,	resolves	any	problems	that	may	arise,	handles	all	re-
quests	for	information	or	questions,	and	ensures	that	the	exercise	runs	smoothly.		
The	white	team	also	has	the	responsibility	for	deriving	lessons-learned,	conducting	
the	post	engagement	assessment,	and	promulgating	results.	(Committee	on	National	
Security	Systems	2010,	81)	
JAMK	does	not	host	competitions	so	definition	parts	with	competition-specific	issues	
is	left	out	by	purpose	in	JAMK	JYVSECTEC	exercises	held	in	RGCE.	In	JAMK	JYVSECTEC	
white	team	is	used	to	define	the	planning	team	and	also	the	ExCon	(exercise	control)	
of	the	actual	exercise.	Also,	the	post	exercise	actions	like	reporting	are	white	team	
responsibilities.	
Better	suited	definition	for	JAMK	is	found	from	Damodaran	(2015,	20)	where	the	
team	is	administrative	management	and	monitoring	team	who	does	assessment	of	
events	and	teams.	
Red	team	
Red	team	in	JAMK	is	a	team	of	specialists	working	mainly	for	JYVSECTEC	business	
unit.	Red	team	attacks	the	organizations	built	inside	the	RGCE	Cyber	range	in	exer-
cise.	In	only	some	rare	occasions,	personnel	from	some	other	organization	other	
than	JAMK	may	be	a	part	of	the	red	team.	Emerging	commercial	offering	to	use	red	
teaming	in	real	world	penetration	testing	might	give	different	definitions	to	red	
teaming	than	is	described	here;	however,	in	JAMK	the	limitation	is	made	to	use	red	
team	only	in	the	RGCE.	
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Red	team	is	a	group	of	people	authorized	and	organized	to	emulate	a	potential	ad-
versary’s	attack	or	exploitation	capabilities	against	an	enterprise’s	security	posture.	
The	red	team’s	objective	is	to	improve	enterprise	Information	Assurance	by	demon-
strating	the	impacts	of	successful	attacks	and	what	works	for	the	defenders	(i.e.,	the	
blue	team)	in	an	operational	environment.	(Committee	on	National	Security	Systems	
2010,	59)		
Blue	team	
As	this	thesis	focuses	on	the	blue	team	the	definition	of	a	blue	team	is	crucial.	In	
most	exercises,	the	blue	team	is	the	team	that	actually	is	the	training	audience,	and	
all	activities	focus	on	aiding	this	team	to	understand	and	learn	the	cyber	events.	The	
blue	team	has	to	be	able	to	understand	what	the	status	of	their	environment	is,	and	
all	intrusion	detection	and	prevention	systems	should	be	built	in	such	a	way	that	red	
team	attacks	can	be	seen	and	mitigated	either	by	the	team	itself	or	with	the	help	of	
the	green	team.	
Blue	team	is	responsible	for	defending	an	enterprise’s	use	of	information	systems	by	
maintaining	its	security	posture	against	a	group	of	mock	attackers	(i.e.,	the	Red	
Team).	Typically,	the	Blue	Team	and	its	supporters	must	defend	against	simulated	at-
tacks	in	a	representative	operational	context	with	the	help	of	a	neutral	group	con-
trolling	the	simulation	or	exercise	(i.e.,	the	White	Team).	(Committee	on	National	Se-
curity	Systems	2010,	7)		
The	key	focus	in	the	technical	exercise	part	should	be	on	defending	an	enterprise’s	
use	of	information	systems.	To	be	able	to	learn	as	much	as	possible,	the	exercises	in	
JYVSECTEC	focus	heavily	on	detection,	gathering,	reporting	and	sharing	actionable	in-
dicators	of	compromise.	It	is	not	feasible	to	block	the	IP-range	of	a	complete	country	
but	to	figure	out	the	actual	attack	vectors,	what	the	attacker	is	doing,	where	the	at-
tacker	comes	from,	how	the	attacker	maneuvers	inside	the	corporation	networks	
and	what	the	main	goal	for	the	attacker	is.	
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This	approach	gives	already	some	useful	requirements	for	the	blue	team	SA	system.	
They	need	to	know	and	understand	the	situation	from	multiple	angles	and	beyond	
the	common	and	traditional	technical	preventative	system	perspective	to	be	success-
ful	in	the	cyber	defense	exercise.	This	understanding	should	be	implemented	in	an	
incident	handling	approach	in	live	environments	as	well.	Often	the	attacker	TTP	is	not	
regarded	as	highly	important	because	business	continuity	is	the	main	focus;	how-
ever,	understanding	the	attacker’s	motives	and	tactics	might	help	in	the	long	run	to	
mitigate	the	risks	more	comprehensively,	and	learning	this	is	one	of	the	key	elements	
in	JYVSECTEC	exercises.	
Green	team	
Green	team	in	JAMK	is	the	team	responsible	for	designing,	building	and	maintaining	
the	RGCE	cyber	range.	This	means	everything	from	ranges	core	services	to	organiza-
tional	networks	and	out-of-game	infrastructures	such	as	learning	facility	networks	
and	the	workstation	used	for	connecting	into	the	range.	
Green	team	is	a	group	of	operators	responsible	for	the	exercise	infrastructure.	They	
configure	all	virtual	computers,	networks	and	complex	monitoring	infrastructure.	The	
Green	team	also	monitors	the	health	of	the	sandbox	and	fixes	crashes	and	infrastruc-
ture	issues	if	needed.	(Celeda	et	al.	2015,	6)	
The	green	team	also	generates	some	part	of	the	injects	designed	by	the	white	team	
and	red	team.	Red	team	and	green	team	must	work	closely	together	in	white-box	
manner	for	the	environments	to	be	exploitable	in	certain	areas.	It	is	not	feasible	or	
cost	effective,	and	it	might	actually	be	a	limiting	factor	for	the	success	of	the	exercise	
if	the	red	team	does	not	know	the	infra	completely.	Red	team	is	not	the	audience	be-
ing	trained.	
4.6 Cyber	range	
Range	is	a	concept	that	is	familiar	to	many	organizations;	however,	it	associates	in	
many	different	ways.	There	is	a	number	of	cyber	ranges	nowadays	in	the	Europe;	yet,	
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quite	often	they	tend	to	be	a	part	of	a	military	or	other	governmental	security	organ-
ization.	Not	much	is	public	information	and	reference	material	is	quite	hard	to	find.	
MITRE	states	that	cyber	range	is	a	controlled	electronical	computing	environment	
with	systems,	networks,	services,	and	users	generally	isolated	from	the	live	network.	
Range	has	a	defined	baseline	of	physical	or	virtual	instances	configured	for	a	sce-
nario.	However,	MITRE	states	range	may	have	drawback	by	creating	unrealistic	or	ar-
tificial	settings.	(Kick	2014,	11)	
According	to	a	study	based	on	publicly	available,	non-classified	information,	there	
are	more	than	30	known	cyber	ranges	and	test	beds	of	emulation	or	simulation	types	
that	could	be	used	for	cyber	exercises	according	to	a	study	made	by	Australian	De-
partment	of	defense.	(Davis	and	Magrath	2013,	24-25)	
JYVSECTEC	RGCE	cyber	range	built	in	JAMK	is	one	of	the	most	advanced	and	compre-
hensive	cyber	ranges	in	Europe.	With	its	realistic	internet	structures,	realistic	sys-
tems,	realistic	services	and	realistic	user	traffic	at	the	core	of	the	development	work,	
this	approach	makes	JAMK	JYVSECTEC’s	cyber	range	unique	in	many	ways.		
Another	academic	cyber	range	example	is	the	KYPO	–	Cyber	Exercise	&	Research	
Platform	developed	and	operated	by	CSIRT-MU	–	the	security	team	of	Masaryk	Uni-
versity.	KYPO	aims	to	provide	a	virtualized	environment	for	performing	complex	
cyber-attacks	against	simulated	critical	infrastructure.	(Celeda	et	al.	2015,	1)	
4.7 Realistic	Global	Cyber	Environment	(RGCE)	cyber	range	
The	foundation	for	realism	in	RGCE	cyber	range	is	made	with	functions	that	mimic	
the	real-world	internet	structure.	RGCE	is	a	totally	isolated	environment	controlled	
by	JAMK	staff.	It	features	real	world	public	IP	structure	with	tier	1-3	operators	and	
fully	functional	BGP	routing.	It	has	also	realistic	name	structures	and	PKI	infrastruc-
tures	to	name	a	few	core	services.	(Vatanen	et	al.	2017,	3)	
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Realistic	user	traffic	simulation	is	a	key	element	in	technical	cyber	exercises	and	for	
this	purpose,	JAMK	has	developed	a	hierarchical	tree-like	network	traffic	simulation	
botnet.	The	traffic	generation	from	this	botnet	can	be	scattered	throughout	the	
RGCE	internet	IP	address	spacing.	With	the	aid	of	this	botnet,	it	is	possible	to	send	
numerous	different	types	of	traffic	and	it	is	up	to	botnet	operator	whether	it	is	mali-
cious	or	legitimate	user	traffic.	(Kokkonen	2016,	23)	
JYVSECTEC’s	cyber	range	also	has	many	different	comprehensive	industry	specific	or-
ganization	environments	representing	certain	fields	of	business,	their	services,	and	
technical	environments	including	the	actual	business	service	systems.	These	cur-
rently	include	a	financial	organization,	an	internet	service	provider,	a	road	tunnel	
provider	and	an	electricity	company.	These	environments	are	not	just	ICT-specific	
systems	but	holistic	environments	down	to	physical	industrial	control	devices.	
(Vatanen	et	al.	2017,	6)	
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5 Situational	awareness		
5.1 Theoretical	background	
When	searching	for	the	concept	of	situational	awareness,	one	finds	that	perhaps	the	
most	referenced	theoretical	model	for	fundamentals	is	made	by	Endsley	in	1995.	
Endsley	states	that	based	on	descriptive	view	of	decision	making,	the	situational	
awareness	is	a	predominant	concern	in	system	design.	(Endsley	1995,	32)	
Endsley’s	ground	breaking	work	in	the	situational	awareness	area	laid	the	founda-
tions	by	using	are	where	the	correct	knowledge	of	the	real	time	situational	aware-
ness	had	been	used	for	a	decision	making	for	a	long	time.	This	was	aviation.	Even	
though	they	had	been	making	decisions	by	these	principles	in	the	aviation	field,	it	
was	Endsley	who	defined	these	in	the	academic	world.	(Endsley	1995,	32-33)	
It	was	soon	understood	that	actually	all	critical	and	real-time	decision-making	pro-
cesses	where	somehow	related	to	this	situational	awareness	issue.	This	made	it	clear	
that	other	areas	and	fields	of	expertise	adopted	situational	awareness	into	their	
studies.	
Cyber	security	is	not	something	that	has	been	here	long	as	a	term	or	as	a	complete	
business.	In	the	last	few	years,	the	whole	cyber	security	industry	and	the	understand-
ing	that	digitalization	forces	all	aspects	of	a	modern	society	into	taking	cyber	security	
as	a	fundamental	part	also	drives	the	need	to	develop	and	define	the	situational	
awareness	into	cyber	security	realm.	
Cyber	security	situational	awareness	involves	technical	and	cognitive	aspects	that	
contribute	to	understanding	of	what	needs	to	be	done	in	order	to	enhance	under-
standing	of	the	cyber	environment.	(Franke	&	Brynielsson	2014,	20)	
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5.2 Different	levels	of	situational	awareness	
Endsley	defines	three	primary	level	components	of	situational	awareness	(Figure	4)	
that	have	a	hierarchical	structure.	These	are	defined	as	individual’s	perception	of	ob-
served	elements,	comprehension	of	the	current	situation	and	the	ability	to	project	
the	future	status	of	things.	(Endsley	1995,	36)	
	
Figure	4	The	levels	of	situational	awareness	(Endsley	1995,	35)	
The	perception	of	elements	in	the	current	situation	at	level	1	in	Endsley’s	model	
simply	means	that	an	individual	perceives	the	status,	attributes	and	dynamics	of	rele-
vant	elements	in	order	to	achieve	situational	awareness.	In	cyber	security,	these	
could	mean,	for	example	alerts	in	defensive	systems	such	as	firewalls	or	IDS/IPS	sys-
tems.	These	types	of	attributes	should	be	accurate	data	so	that	decision-making	is	
based	on	facts.	(Endsley	1995,	36-37)	
Level	2	is	the	comprehension	of	the	current	situation.	This	is	a	synthesis	of	the	ele-
ments	at	level	1.	The	elements	themselves	usually	do	not	make	a	holistic	understand-
ing	but	a	collection	of	data	helps	the	decision	maker	in	forming	patterns.	In	the	cyber	
security	context,	it	could	mean	that	if	a	single	computer	is	affected	with	malware,	it	
could	be	that	one	person	is	possibly	generating	a	risk	by	accident	or	by	purpose.	But	
if	at	rapid	speed	multiple	computers	start	to	alert	from	a	similar	issue,	there	might	be	
an	outbreak	of	malware,	or	some	pattern	matching	has	started	to	alert	as	a	false	pos-
itive.	In	CSIRT	thinking,	there	is	not	really	much	difference	in	reaction;	however,	as	a	
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situational	awareness	issue	these	two	are	completely	different	scenarios	driven	by	
the	level	1	elements.	(Endsley	1995,	37)	
The	projection	of	future	status	is	the	ability	that	forms	the	highest	level	of	situational	
awareness.	It	is	achieved	by	knowledge	of	status	and	dynamics	of	elements	and	com-
prehension	of	situation	from	level	1	and	level	2	situational	awareness.	As	in	a	cyber-
incident	manager	role,	a	senior	tends	to	figure	out	the	urgency	and	criticality	faster	
than	a	person	just	starting	in	this	type	of	role.	This	leads	into	more	precise	projection	
of	future	status	which	is	the	level	3	SA.	(Endsley	1995,	37)	
Therefore,	it	is	quite	obvious	that	SA	is	based	on	far	more	than	simply	perceiving	in-
formation.	It	includes	comprehending	the	meaning	of	information,	comparing	it	to	
goals	and	providing	projections	into	the	future	state	of	environment.	This	is	crucial	
for	decision-making	process	as	stated	by	Endsley.	(Endsley	1995,	37)	
By	defining	these	three	levels	in	a	more	detailed	manner	as	is	illustrated	in	Figure	5,	
Endsley	(1995,	35)	demonstrates	how	a	person’s	different	levels	of	understanding	
the	situational	awareness	works	as	a	foundation	for	decision	making	that	ultimately	
leads	to	actions.		
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Figure	5	The	framework	model	(Endsley	1995,	35)	
Endsley’s	framework	model	shows	the	loop	where	the	decisions	formed	by	situa-
tional	awareness	lead	into	the	performance	of	actions.	In	a	detailed	model,	the	deci-
sion	point	needs	input	from	individual	factors	including	such	issues	as	objectives,	ex-
pectations,	long	term	memory	and	automaticity.	(Endsley	1995,	35)	
One	should	note	from	the	model	that	the	actions	alter	the	state	of	the	environment,	
and	by	this	mechanism	they	actually	change	the	perception	of	elements,	comprehen-
sion	of	situation	and	projection	of	future.	This	loop	alters	the	individual	situational	
awareness	constantly.	In	cyber	security	incidents,	the	actions	to	block	hostile	traffic	
or	the	mitigation	of	a	vulnerability	in	workstations	will	alter	the	visibility	of	elements	
in	security	systems	that	act	as	an	input	for	level	1	situational	awareness.	
If	one	understands	the	complexity	of	modern	corporate	networks	and	systems	and	at	
the	same	time	has	understanding	about	the	amount	of	data	flows	and	network	traf-
fic	that	is	generated	even	in	small	scale	environments,	the	situational	awareness	of	
the	problem	starts	to	form.		
This	is	the	reason	why	so	many	automation	systems	and	security	controls	are	mar-
keted	today	as	a	situational	awareness	tools.	They	actually	can	be	understood	as	SA	
systems	because	they	aid	in	perception,	comprehension,	projection	of	future	and	aid	
in	performing	actions.	They,	however,	do	this	in	one	or	more	aspects;	however,	be-
cause	of	the	complexity	no	silver	bullet	solutions	exist.	Some	huge	systems	try	to	
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tackle	this	and	offer	an	umbrella	system	of	sorts	but	because	the	issue	is	so	complex	
they	tend	to	eat	all	possible	resources	and	yet	fall	short.	
In	the	context	of	cyber	security	exercise,	the	decision-making	process	tends	to	be	
fast.	In	JAMK	exercises,	the	perception	of	elements	part	is	a	well-thought	issue	and	
the	cyber	incident	can	be	found	out	from	systems.	When	there	are	plenty	of	actions	
going	on,	there	is	clearly	a	need	for	a	solution	that	helps	somehow	with	making	a	
more	holistic	comprehension	of	current	situation	possible.	
This	thesis	tries	to	state	a	requirement	set	for	such	a	system	that	could	be	then	de-
veloped	or	scrapped.	These	types	of	systems	are	not	found	at	the	moment;	however,	
the	need	is	rapidly	growing	also	outside	the	training	context.	In	many	de-briefings	af-
ter	an	exercise	it	has	been	stated	that	it	would	be	helpful	to	have	such	a	system	not	
only	in	exercises	but	also	at	security	work	in	companies.	
5.3 Situational	awareness	for	teams	
Later	the	types	of	exercises	are	defined;	however,	this	thesis	aims	in	helping	a	team	
to	form	situational	awareness	in	a	cyber	security	exercise	in	order	to	perform	good	
actions	based	on	decisions	made	with	valid	information.	
As	was	shown	earlier,	each	person	forms	their	own	situational	awareness	as	it	is	an	
individual	process.	Then	it	must	be	obvious	that	when	gathering	SA	in	a	team,	the	fi-
nal	SA	is	actually	a	mixed	combination	from	multiple	persons.		
Most	often	team	members	have	their	own	specific	sets	of	their	information	sources,	
such	as	defensive	systems	for	cyber	incidents	that	they	know	better	than	someone	
else,	and	therefore	it	is	common	that	the	individual	SA	elements	overlap.	It	is	also	a	
fact	that	a	person	categorizes	their	own	issues	to	be	more	critical	because	they	for	
their	individual	SA	based	on	their	understanding	of	the	situation.	
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Team	situational	awareness	is	shown	in	Figure	6.	Some	overlaps	between	each	team	
member’s	SA	requirements	are	bound	to	happen.	This	subset	of	information	consti-
tutes	much	of	the	team	coordination.	According	to	Endsley,	this	coordination	may	
occur	as	verbal	communication,	as	a	duplication	of	information	or	by	some	other	
means.	The	overall	team	SA	can	be	conceived	as	the	degree	of	in	which	all	team	
members	possess	the	SA	for	their	responsibilities.	(Endsley	1995,	39)	
	
Figure	6	Team	situational	awareness	(Endsley	1995,	39)	
When	thinking	how	crucial	this	situational	awareness	is	for	a	team	success	and	learn-
ing	possibilities	in	cyber	exercise,	it	is	understandable	what	Endsley	(1995,	39-40)	is	
saying.	There	is	evidence	that	a	person’s	manner	of	characterizing	a	situation	will	de-
termine	the	decision	process	for	solving	problems.	Some	other	evidence	states	that	
even	the	way	the	problem	is	presented	affects	decisions.	On	the	other	hand,	the	re-
lationship	between	SA	and	performance	is	not	direct	but	can	be	predicted.	In	gen-
eral,	it	is	understood	that	with	inaccurate	or	incomplete	situational	awareness,	the	
decisions	will	lead	into	poor	performance.	There	are	studies	that	state,	on	the	other	
hand,	that	if	team	members	understand	that	the	SA	is	lacking,	they	tend	to	perform	
better	than	those	that	think	they	have	all	needed	elements.	(Endsley	1995,	39-40)	
The	situational	awareness	is	a	key	element	and	the	more	time	critical	the	problems	
are	the	more	crucial	the	correct	and	well	shared	information	is.	In	cyber	security	inci-
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dents,	the	data	is	moving	so	fast	that	humans	are	unable	to	process	it.	Also,	the	sys-
tems	are	so	complex	that	humans	cannot	look	at	all	things	all	the	time.	This	is	why	
automation	and	situational	awareness	systems	are	needed.		
5.4 Cyber	security	situational	awareness	
Even	though	in	most	of	the	cases	the	basic	ideas	for	situational	awareness	in	cyber	
security	derive	themselves	from	the	works	of	Endsley	(1995),	the	modern	implemen-
tations	made	for	the	cyber	security	have	many	outcomes.		
Hence,	it	is	often	said	in	the	talks	that	there	are	as	many	different	understandings	
about	what	the	situational	awareness	means	in	cyber	security	context	as	there	are	
talkers	and	listeners.		
Cyber	security	situational	awareness	can	be	taken	as	a	subset	of	situational	aware-
ness.	It	is	the	part	of	overall	situational	awareness	that	can	be	gathered	with	tech-
nical	systems	and	cognitive	understanding	from	the	cyber	environment.	(Franke	&	
Brynielsson	2014,	26-2	
There	are,	however,	some	studies	made	and	definitions	stated	that	may	help	in	de-
fining	and	scoping	the	boundaries	of	understanding	of	the	cyber	security	situational	
awareness	in	more	detail	manner.	
Barford	et	al.	(2010,	3-4)	have	defined	interesting	categorization	aspects	that	differ	
from	the	traditional	Endsley	model	and	actually	somehow	make	the	somewhat	theo-
retical	model	more	defined	and	perhaps	easier	to	understand	in	normal	day	to	day	
actions.	This	categorization	has	seven	major	points:	
1. Be	aware	of	the	current	situation.	This	aspect	can	also	be	called	situation	per-
ception.	Situation	perception	includes	both	situation	recognition	and	identifi-
cation.	
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2. Be	aware	of	the	impact	of	the	attack.	This	aspect	can	also	be	called	impact	as-
sessment.		
3. Be	aware	of	how	situations	evolve.	Situation	tracking	is	a	major	component	of	
this	aspect.	 	
4. Be	aware	of	actor	(adversary)	behavior.	 	
5. Be	aware	of	why	and	how	the	current	situation	is	caused.	 	
6. Be	aware	of	the	quality	(and	trustworthiness)	of	the	collected	situation	
awareness	information	items	and	the	knowledge-intelligence-decisions	de-
rived	from	these	information	items.	 	
7. Assess	plausible	futures	of	the	current	situation.	 	
These	can	be	easily	adopted	to	fit	the	cyber	security	context	and	even	though	the	
fundamentals	have	the	same	ideology	that	Endsley’s	model	has,	the	more	precise	
mentions	about	the	actual	impact	of	an	attack	and	the	references	made	to	threat	ac-
tor	or	adversary	clearly	define	this	categorization	to	be	highly	suitable	when	talking	
about	the	cyber	security	situational	awareness.		
This,	of	course,	is	not	the	only	way	to	define	the	situational	awareness	issue	and	by	
looking	at	one	other	categorization	that	goes	even	into	more	detailed	and	technical	
level,	one	starts	to	understand	that	there	is	clearly	a	need	to	be	somewhat	specific	
and	precise	in	making	decisions	about	what	the	cyber	security	situational	awareness	
means	in	this	thesis.	
One	such	interesting	framework	can	be	found	according	to	the	NIST	cybersecurity	
framework	paper	done	by	Tri-County	Electric	Cooperative,	Inc.	It	studied	the	situa-
tional	awareness	for	critical	infrastructure	and	key	resources	(CIKR)	and	it	stated	that	
there	are	five	major	points	(NIST	2013,	2):	
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1. Accurate	awareness	of	a	utilities	cybersecurity	network	and	the	CIKR	that	is	a	
part	of	that	network.		
2. Complete	understanding	of	the	utilities	cybersecurity	operations	and	the	indi-
vidual	CIKR	that	contributes	to	the	overall	process	of	the	utilities	system.		
3. Proper	assessment	of	the	current	operations	occurring	within	the	utilities	cy-
bersecurity	network	and	the	ability	to	assess	potential	breakdowns,	weak	ar-
eas	or	vulnerabilities	that	can	be	exploited	to	a	maximum	effect	in	crippling	a	
utilities	system.		
4. Monitoring	of	unusual	events	or	occurrences	within	the	cybersecurity	net-
work.		
5. Flexibility	to	approach	possible	threats	and	mitigate	them	before	they	can	be	
successful.		
Based	on	these,	it	is	safe	to	state	that	when	thinking	of	the	situational	awareness	sys-
tem	requirements	for	the	blue	team	in	cyber	exercises,	there	is	a	need	to	address	the	
human	factor	as	a	decision	maker.	On	the	other	hand,	one	must	try	to	keep	in	mind	
not	only	the	actual	awareness	of	what	is	thought	to	be	the	norm	but	also	to	think	
about	how	to	gather	information	about	the	adversaries.	In	the	core	and	as	a	founda-
tion	for	all	activities,	one	must	also	understand	the	core	nature	of	cyber	security	
events	that	is	the	detailed	technical	aspect	of	things.	
There	is	plenty	of	talk	about	how	cyber	security	is	much	more	than	just	the	hacker	
and	technology	issues.	This	is	of	course	a	fact	in	it	itself;	however,	it	should	be	re-
membered	that	the	very	issue	why	cyber	security	is	such	a	big	thing	is	that	detailed	
technical	security	flaws	are	at	the	heart	of	cyber.		
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The	amount	of	data	to	be	processed	even	in	the	small	systems	and	networks	is	so	
vast	that	technical	solutions	are	also	a	key	in	solving	a	big	part	of	situational	aware-
ness	dilemma	so	that	the	non-technical	decision-making	process	of	humans	is	feasi-
ble.	
5.5 Situational	awareness	information	consumers	and	provider	systems	
As	written	in	the	previous	paragraphs,	it	is	clear	that	cyber	security	and	its	situational	
awareness	is	much	more	than	just	a	technical	issue,	which	leads	straight	to	the	con-
clusion	that	all	aspects	are	impossible	to	understand	deeply	by	single	individuals.		
The	conclusion	then	must	be	that	there	is	a	vast	number	of	roles	and	responsibilities	
related	to	situational	awareness	decision-making.	The	need	for	information	by	many	
different	persons	is	clear.	One	could	argue	correctly	that	whether	one	realizes	it	or	
not,	everyone	related	to	either	system	management,	cyber	security,	operational	or	
strategical	level	decision	making	will	automatically	form	their	own	personal	cyber	se-
curity	situational	awareness	understanding	according	to	the	information	they	see	
and	hear.	The	theoretical	background	was	explained	earlier	in	this	thesis	according	to	
the	Endsley	framework	in	chapter	5.2	and	refined	by	Barford	and	NIST	definitions	in	
chapter	5.4.	
At	least	some	of	the	key	information	consumers	that	have	been	identified	by	the	au-
thor	during	the	professional	career	of	over	10	years	in	systems	management	and	
cyber	security	field	are	illustrated	in	Figure	7.	
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Figure	7	Cyber	Security	information	consumers	and	providers	
By	making	this	kind	of	visualization,	it	is	easier	to	understand	the	core	elements	
providing	information	and	displaying	it	when	defining	the	requirements.	
One	could	argue	correctly	that	because	there	is	not	one	clear	and	precise	definition	
and	understanding	about	this	issue,	then	this	way	of	thinking	is	just	one	possible	out-
come	and	does	not	cover	all	aspects.		
This	is	understood	and	this	thesis	only	tries	to	cover	the	fundamental	aspects	related	
to	cyber	security	exercises	held	at	JAMK	University	of	Applied	Sciences.	This,	how-
ever,	is	not	a	limiting	factor	and	there	are	no	reasons	why	this	specification	could	not	
address	this	situational	awareness	system	dilemma	for	CERTs	and	CSIRTs	also	as	a	
possible	approach	for	future	studies	and	trials.	
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6 Cyber	security	situational	awareness	system	approaches	
There	are	some	cyber	security	specific	situational	awareness	proposals	found	from	
scientific	research	papers.	The	main	ideological	differences	with	the	system	specified	
in	this	thesis	versus	what	can	be	found	is	that	they	are	designed	to	tackle	some	tech-
nical	aspects	or	are	driven	by	the	need	to	aid	CERT	functions.	
In	a	cyber-exercise,	there	are	many	similarities	to	a	real	organization’s	threat	man-
agement	and	incident	response	processes,	and	the	blue	teams	use	these	processes	
when	taking	part	in	exercises.	However,	the	exercise	framework	sets	its	own	needs	
to	the	situational	awareness	systems	and	makes	the	actual	work	somewhat	different.	
In	exercises,	there	are	needs	to	report	events	to	game	management	which	is	specific	
requirements	for	a	system	that	this	thesis	is	researching.		
Also,	information	sharing	to	other	partners	might	not	always	be	a	feasible	task	in	an	
exercise.	Often	the	live	threat	intelligence	feed	from	internet,	outside	partners	or	
from	other	teams	might	not	at	all	be	a	part	of	the	exercise.	There	are	some	exercises	
where	the	information	sharing	is	fundamental	part,	and	for	these	occasions,	generic	
tools	such	as	MISP	(Malware	Information	Sharing	Platform)	can	be	implemented	for	
this	task.	In	CERT	work	this	is	a	core	requirement	but	in	exercise	keeping	the	situa-
tion	awareness	of	team	actions	and	the	communication	to	game	control	is	much	
more	important.	
CAIS	(Cyber	Attack	Information	System)	project	proposed	a	concept	for	a	system	ar-
chitecture	to	be	used	in	Austria	for	national	cyber	situational	awareness.	This	con-
cept	is	a	typical	example	of	the	situational	awareness	system	development	where	
the	collaboration	and	threat	sharing	from	multiple	organizations	to	national	CERT	is	
the	driver.	This	type	of	system	architecture	is	not	suitable	for	exercise	needs;	how-
ever,	it	can	provide	useful	insight	into	situational	awareness	systems	and	be	used	as	
requirement	giving	research.	(Skopik	et	al.	2012,	4)	
Another	usual	research	approach	to	situational	awareness	is	to	use	automation	and	
technical	sensor	approach.	This	type	of	approach	is	suitable	when	data	fusion	is	used.	
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There	are	not	many	commercial	systems	at	this	time	that	use	this	approach;	how-
ever,	a	novel	architecture	design	for	such	a	system	was	proposed	by	Kokkonen	
(2016,	298-299)	That	research	can	be	thought	as	baseline	research	for	this	thesis.	
That	kind	of	approach	could	solve	some	aspects;	however,	it	does	not	cover	CERT	
function	or	cyber	exercise	control	functions.	It	was	used	as	a	requirement	source.	
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7 Requirements	for	blue	team	SA	system	
When	analyzing	the	blue	team	definitions,	situational	awareness	systems	and	exer-
cise	types	defined	earlier,	it	is	obvious	that	depending	of	the	exercise	type,	the	blue	
team	consists	of	multiple	types	of	personnel.	This	means	that	requirements	for	situa-
tional	awareness	can	be	found	by	analyzing	multiple	operational	functions.	
The	main	idea	in	cyber	exercise	is	to	be	able	to	learn	from	the	injects.	Learning	objec-
tives	don’t	say	that	learning	to	use	some	new	and	novel	system	is	the	main	focus	in	
the	exercise.	This	fact	alone	sets	some	requirements.	The	SA	system	needs	to	be	in-
tuitive	and	easy	to	use.	
Another	learning	objective	is	to	understand	and	find	out	the	attacker	tactics,	tech-
niques	and	procedures	(TTP)	from	security	controls	and	try	to	understand	the	whole	
attack	scenario.	Therefore,	there	is	a	fine	line	where	too	much	automation	is	starting	
to	hinder	this	learning	objective.	
This	system	is	aimed	at	helping	the	team	form	their	SA	about	the	actions	in	the	exer-
cise,	not	to	do	the	work	for	them	by	utilizing	data-fusion,	robotics,	automation	etc.	
The	objective	is	to	understand	what	the	team	is	doing	and	how	they	figure	out	what	
is	relevant	and	what	is	not.	At	the	same	time,	they	actually	report	to	the	game	man-
agement	the	team	status	without	having	to	think	too	much	reporting	as	a	separated	
function.	
This	system	will	also	help	in	analyzing	after	the	exercise	what	the	team	did	and	when	
and	how.	This	helps	JYVSECTEC	personnel	in	writing	better	after-action	reports	to	the	
exercise	organizations.	
7.1 Blue	team	SA	in	cyber	security	exercise	
Because	everyone	in	the	team	needs	to	understand	the	situation,	and	therefore	form	
their	SA,	they	are	considered	as	information	users.	IR	(Incident	Response)	function	is	
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obvious;	however,	in	most	exercises,	there	is	also	operational	administrator	person-
nel	who	contributes	to	mitigation	and	observation	functions.	In	some	occasions,	the	
teams	might	also	include	business	manager	and	communication	manager	roles.	
Other	roles	are	usually	played	by	the	white	team	and	are	not	users	of	this	blue	team	
SA	system.	Those	roles	use	the	SA	system	from	exercise	control	perspective.	
Regarding	requirements,	these	roles	and	the	supporting	systems	needed	by	them	are	
considered	as	information	consumers	or	information	providers.	Examining	those	
leads	to	identification	of	many	technical	systems	and	some	obvious	relations	they	
have.	
The	author	has	formed	a	rough	layout	in	Figure	8	with	some	of	the	key	elements	that	
contribute	as	an	information	source	to	the	situational	awareness	and	should	there-
fore	be	considered	as	sources	for	requirements.	
	
Figure	8	Systems	contributing	information	to	the	situational	awareness.	
Requirements	are	briefly	stated	in	this	section	and	a	more	comprehensive	table	of	
the	requirements	is	attached	in	Appendix	1.	The	requirements	are	the	main	results	of	
this	thesis	with	the	construction	proposal.	
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7.2 Usage	requirements	
UI	(User	interface)	requirements	section	covers	the	requirements	that	are	not	spe-
cific	for	any	system	users	but	are	necessary	when	defining	some	general	points	in	
this	system.	These	requirements	focus	on	ease	of	use	and	other	general	aspects.	The	
actual	design	and	graphical	aspects	are	not	defined	because	they	are	irrelevant	in	
this	stage	and	are	part	of	the	design	and	implementation	phases.	
The	information	that	blue	teams	need	to	form	in	a	cyber-exercise	can	be	categorized	
in	many	ways;	yet,	in	JAMK	exercises	the	main	information	classes	are	defined	by	
JYVSECTEC	as:	
1. Observation:	This	is	a	single	event	about	almost	anything;	however,	the	exer-
cise	audience	should	report	mainly	exercise	related	shortcomings,	develop-
ment	ideas	and	other	feedback.	
2. Issue:	This	is	an	event	relating	to	flaw,	error	or	missing	information	about	
OOG	(out-of-game)	or	IG	(in-game)	that	is	handled	by	the	GT	(green	team)	
3. Incident:	These	are	reported	and	managed	events	in	the	game	that	the	blue	
team	has	seen	and	decides	to	investigate	further;	all	events	should	lead	to	ac-
tions	and	ultimately	contain	actionable	data	or	they	are	understood	as	obser-
vations.	Cyber	Incidents	include	also	in-game	OSINT	(Open	source	intelli-
gence),	HUMINT	(Human	Intelligence),	social	media	etc.	related	Incidents	
The	reporting	of	information	should	be	fast,	quick,	intuitive	and	easy.	Most	of	the	
systems	marketed	as	SA	systems	are	complex	and	yet	they	lack	fundamental	ele-
ments	such	as	timeline	functions,	or	are	not	intuitive	and	flexible	in	information	
modification.	
Requirement	1.1	Multiple	information	types	
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System	shall	be	able	to	handle	different	main	information	types	needed	in	different	
exercise	functions.		
Requirement	1.1.1	Information	type	Observation	
System	shall	be	able	to	handle	observation	type	of	information.	
Requirement	1.1.2	Information	type	Issue	
System	shall	be	able	to	handle	issue	type	of	information.	
Requirement	1.1.3	Information	type	Incident	
System	shall	be	able	to	handle	incident	type	of	information.	
Requirement	1.2	Simplicity	of	usage	
System	shall	be	easy	to	use	as	too	complex	user	interfaces	can	push	exercise	partici-
pants	to	opt	out.	
Requirement	1.2.1	Information	input	field	maximum	
There	should	be	a	maximum	of	eight	fields	the	user	needs	to	input	in	order	to	push	
any	of	the	information	types	into	SA	system.	This	requirement	is	important	but	may	
change	according	to	learnings	from	design,	implementation	and	test	phases.	It	must	
be	emphasized	strongly	that	any	additions	above	six	might	be	counterproductive.	
Requirement	1.2.2	No	separate	login	credentials	
System	shall	not	have	separate	login	credentials.	This	is	crucial	because	the	more	sys-
tems	exercise	participants	have	to	sign	into,	the	more	of	them	are	left	unused.	
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Requirement	1.2.3	Single	sign-on	with	exercise	credentials	
Login	shall	be	automatically	implemented	as	single	sign-on	function	into	SA	at	the	
same	time	when	an	exercise	participant	is	logging	into	a	cyber	range	machine.	
Requirement	1.2.4	Automated	opening	of	the	SA	system	
The	user	shall	login	automatically	into	SA	system.	This	process	will	make	it	obvious	
for	the	exercise	participants	that	this	system	is	critical,	and	the	usage	of	such	system	
is	an	integral	part	of	the	exercise.	
Requirement	1.2.5	Input	form	according	to	information	type	
Human	input	system	shall	change	the	information	fields	automatically	according	to	
user	selection	of	information	type.	
Requirement	1.2.6	IG-OOG	hybrid	structure	
There	shall	be	only	one	interface	for	information	input.	The	information	can	be	used	
from	in-game	or	out-of-game	perspectives	according	to	information	user	being	a	part	
of	blue	team	or	some	other	team	respectively.	
Requirement	1.2.7	Limited	amount	of	graphics	
The	user	interfaces	should	not	be	too	graphical	in	nature.	The	simple	input	field	ap-
plication	with	limited	information	is	preferred.	The	limited	graphics	means	that	it	is	
easily	adopted	and	don’t	distract	users	from	the	tasks	of	the	exercise.	
Requirement	1.2.8	Dynamic	view	
The	user	shall	be	able	to	select	the	parts	to	be	visible.	The	system	users	need	to	form	
individual	SA	so	the	view	into	SA	system	needs	to	be	individually	customizable.	
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Requirement	1.2.9	Automatic	event	change	indicator	
The	system	shall	change	the	visual	marking	in	system	when	event	is	changed	some-
how.	This	requirement	is	related	to	Requirement	5.2.3	Automatic	relation.	The	user	
needs	to	see	some	kind	of	marking	if	automation	is	adding	relations	that	the	user	
didn’t	know.	This	way	even	events	marked	as	ready	or	done	might	actually	be	valua-
ble	in	some	later	phase	of	the	exercise	as	new	information	arise.	
7.3 Blue	team	user	requirements	
Blue	team	can	be	considered	as	a	form	of	CSIRT	team	and	therefore	to	have	certain	
requirements	for	an	SA	system	from	this	role.	Requirements	for	CSIRT	SA	has	to	be	
taken	into	account.	Not	many	of	those	can	be	easily	adapted	to	suit	the	exercise	
needs	as	they	focus	heavily	on	normal	day-to-day	CSIRT	operations	and	often	relate	
to	bigger	phenomena	than	single	organization.	Some	requirements	can	still	be	de-
rived	from	material	concerning	CSIRT	SA.	
According	to	Ruefle	(2014,	5)	CSIRT	needs	to	understand	where	weaknesses	occur	
and	when	malicious	actors	are	taking	advantage	of	these	weaknesses.	They	also	pro-
pose	that	any	new	tool	for	situational	awareness	should	not	only	focus	on	current	at-
tacks	but	should	also	strive	to	collect	lessons	learned	and	after-the-fact	analysis.		
This	way	of	reasoning	is	also	crucial	for	understanding	better	in	JAMK	cyber	exercise	
what	has	happened	and	how	to	mitigate.	The	main	goal	is	to	find	out	the	root	cause	
so	that	it	could	help	in	mitigating	the	attacks	effectively.	Another	key	point	in	blue	
team	actions	is	to	gather	actionable	IOCs	(Indicator	of	Compromise)	that	can	be	de-
livered	to	other	teams	or	to	the	white	team.	
The	majority	of	needs	are	focused	on	incident	event	class.	Issues	and	observations	
are	mainly	such	that	the	information	is	not	changing	during	the	exercise.	They	are	
snapshots	in	time	when	inputted.	Incidents	are,	however,	handled	by	many	and	usu-
ally	the	information	is	growing,	changing	and	relationships	to	other	incidents	are	
added	during	investigations.	
		
47	
Regarding	incidents	Cichonski,	Millar,	Grance	&	Scarfone	(2012,	31)	have	identified	
many	information	that	incident	handlers	should	gather.	From	these	applicable	to	
JAMK	exercise	context	are;	status	of	incident,	summary,	indicators,	related	incidents.	
Requirement	2.1	Title	of	incident	
Users	of	the	system	shall	be	able	to	assign	free	text	format	title	to	incident	so	that	it	
is	easily	identifiable.	This	should	not	be	too	long	as	there	are	description	field	for	ac-
tual	information.	
Requirement	2.1.1	Search	of	incident	
Users	shall	be	able	to	search	for	existing	incidents	directly	from	the	title	field.	This	is	
to	help	avoid	generating	multiple	inputs	from	same	incident.	
Requirement	2.2	Criticality	level	of	incident	
Users	of	the	system	shall	be	able	to	assign	criticality	value	to	incident.	
Requirement	2.2.1	Textual	level	of	incident	
Users	of	the	system	shall	be	able	to	assign	textual	value	to	incident.	If	a	team	is	using	
written	criticality	values	they	can	do	so.	
Requirement	2.2.2	Numerical	level	of	incident	
Users	of	the	system	shall	be	able	to	assign	numerical	value	to	incident.	If	a	team	is	
using	numbers	for	criticality	they	can	do	so.	
Requirement	2.2.3	Change	the	criticality	level	of	incident	
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Users	of	the	system	shall	be	able	to	change	the	criticality	of	incident	according	to	
their	needs.	Incidents	change	their	criticality	when	they	are	investigated.	
Requirement	2.3	Assignment	of	incident	
Users	shall	be	able	to	assign	individuals	to	be	responsible	in	handling	incidents	in	
team.	
Requirement	2.3.1	Change	assignment	
Users	shall	be	able	to	change	assignment	of	incident	according	to	their	needs.	Many	
individuals	might	take	part	in	handling	incidents	
Requirement	2.4	State	of	the	incident	
Users	shall	be	able	to	assign	state	to	incidents.	Team	uses	this	to	monitor	what	the	
status	of	an	incident	is.	States	vary	according	to	definitions	used	by	team	but	often	
they	could	be	something	like	opened,	processed,	closed,	reopened.	
Requirement	2.4.1	Change	the	state	of	the	incident	
Users	shall	be	able	to	change	state	of	incidents.		
Requirement	2.5	Incident	description	input	
Users	shall	be	able	to	use	free	text	field	in	describing	what	they	are	doing.	It	could	be	
information	they	have	monitored	or	something	they	found	in	investigation.		
Requirement	2.6	Actionable	data	input	
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Users	shall	be	able	to	use	free	text	field	in	describing	what	they	define	as	actionable	
data.	These	can	be	IOCs,	notions	of	attackers	or	other	information	that	users	of	the	
system	think	are	relevant	to	other	teams	or	to	white	team.	
Requirement	2.7	Tagging	of	events	
Users	shall	be	able	to	assign	free	text	tags	to	events.	
Requirement	2.8	Relationship	of	events	
Users	shall	be	able	to	assign	relationships	to	events	if	they	know	any.	
Requirement	2.9	Timeline	of	events	
Users	shall	be	able	to	see	events	of	interest	in	a	graphical	timeline.	
Requirement	2.9.1	Selection	of	events	to	timeline	
Users	shall	be	able	to	filter	and	select	events	and	modification	points	to	events	as	
they	wish	in	timeline.	User	could	want	to	see	single	event	and	its	modifications	or	
maybe	all	events	with	same	tag	or	IOC	information.	
Requirement	2.9.2	Information	input	from	timeline	
Users	shall	be	able	to	alter	the	information	directly	from	timeline.	This	is	to	make	
sure	that	dynamic	handling	of	the	events	is	implemented	and	there	is	no	need	to	go	
into	input	system	to	search	and	change	things.	Information	should	be	automatically	
visible	in	other	user	timeline	if	display	parameters	are	set	to	find	this.	
Requirement	2.9.3	Dynamic	timeline	
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Timeline	should	be	dynamic	and	presented	information	should	change	automatically	
when	alterations	to	display	parameters	are	issued	by	the	user.	
Requirement	2.9.4	Individual	timeline	
Timelines	should	be	individual	as	each	person	has	their	own	needs	for	information	to	
form	individual	SA.	If	person	changes	display	parameters	it	affects	to	personal	time-
line	only.	
Requirement	2.9.5	Shareable	timeline	
Timelines	should	be	shareable	as	persons	might	want	to	share	their	views	to	a	data	
in	order	to	form	similar	SA	from	information	selected.	
Requirement	2.10	Event	pane	
Events	shall	be	presented	in	an	event	pane	as	persons	might	be	accustomed	to	see-
ing	data	in	traditional	formats.	
Requirement	2.10.1	Searchable	event	pane	
Events	should	be	freely	searchable	by	regular	expressions	or	free	text.	
Requirement	2.10.2	Selectable	event	pane	
Events	should	be	freely	selectable	by	fields	visible	in	pane.	
Requirement	2.11	Event	dashboard	
Events	shall	be	presented	in	selectable	dashboard	views	as	persons	might	be	accus-
tomed	to	seeing	data	in	traditional	formats.	Not	too	many	visualizations	should	be	
made	in	order	to	keep	system	as	simple	as	feasible.	
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Requirement	2.11.1	Pie-chart	dashboard	
Event	pane	information	should	be	viewable	in	pie-chart	format.	
Requirement	2.11.2	Key-value	pair	chart	
Selected	event	pane	information	should	be	viewable	in	key-value	pair	chart.	
With	the	help	of	these	requirements	blue	team	should	be	able	to	do	the	fundamen-
tal	tasks	needed	in	managing	the	core	exercise	events.	This	system	helps	to	visualize	
the	information	team	has	decided	to	handle.		
7.4 White	team	requirements		
These	requirements	are	specific	for	white	teams:	they	need	to	understand	what	the	
blue	team(s)	is/are	reporting,	mitigating	and	putting	resources	to.	This	information	is	
critical	in	order	to	make	sure	that	the	planned	and	delivered	injects	generate	the	de-
sired	effects	so	that	the	exercise	needs	are	met.	(Damodaran	2015,	20)	
In	the	exercise	context,	as	blue	teams	are	using	the	SA	system	they	also	report	their	
findings	automatically	to	the	white	team.	Reporting	IOC’s,	actions	taken	and	the	root	
cause	analysis	by	blue	teams	not	only	ensures	that	learning	objectives	are	met	but	
also	makes	the	game	management	easier,	and	makes	sure	that	time	is	not	wasted	in	
issues	that	are	unrelated	to	the	exercise.	
This	blue	team	situational	awareness	system,	therefore,	functions	also	as	one	of	the	
exercise	control	means	and	that	way	contributes	to	white	team	personnel	situational	
awareness	about	the	exercise	itself.		
White	team	is	only	observing	and	using	the	system	as	an	information	consumer	so	
there	are	not	many	white	team	specific	requirements	that	would	differ	from	blue	
team	requirements.	Some	requirements,	however,	are	vital	to	white	team	as	it	has	
profound	needs	to	gather	information	from	multiple	blue	teams.		
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Requirement	3.1	Visualize	multiple	blue	team	information	
System	shall	be	able	to	visualize	multiple	blue	teams’	information	in	single	views.		
Requirement	3.2	Multiple	team	selection	
White	team	shall	be	able	to	select	information	from	multiple	blue	teams.	This	selec-
tion	is	limited	only	to	white	team	as	blue	teams	shall	not	see	each	other’s	infor-
mation.	
Requirement	3.2.1	Team	selection	in	pane	
White	team	shall	have	additional	team	information	in	event	pane.	
Requirement	3.2.2	Team	selection	in	dashboards	
White	team	shall	have	additional	team	information	selection	in	dashboards.	
Requirement	3.2.3	Team	selection	in	timeline	
White	team	shall	have	additional	team	information	selection	in	timeline.	
7.5 Interconnectivity	requirements	
This	requirement	section	covers	the	requirements	coming	from	other	technical	sys-
tems	that	are	connected	into	SA	system.	There	are	vast	number	of	SA	related	infor-
mation	systems	that	can	be	implemented	as	source	feeds	into	this	blue	team	system.	
Cyber	environments	evolve	and	change	rapidly.	It	should	be	evident	that	also	the	
business	model	and	area	of	business	affects	to	the	cyber	environment	needs.	These	
needs	affect	to	the	security	approach	and	ultimately	to	the	security	measures	and	
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processes	implemented.	There	are	a	number	of	differences	in	security	providing	sys-
tems	if	one	would	compare	the	needs	of	a	road	tunnel	operator	to	the	needs	of	a	
cloud	service	provider.	
Keeping	in	mind	the	complexity	of	cyber	environments	implemented;	difference	in	
data	coming	from	security	systems	and	the	plan-based	design	method	it	is	obvious	
that	flexibility	and	adaptability	in	interconnectivity	to	this	blue	team	SA	system	is	a	
must.	There	are	no	clear	definitions	what	different	application	programming	inter-
faces	(API)	are	ultimately	needed	so	this	has	to	be	done	in	design	and	implementa-
tion	phase,	but	it	is	obvious	that	no	single	technology	exists.	
Requirement	4.1	Multiple	API	support	
System	shall	accept	different	methods	in	connection	to	other	computer	systems	and	
services.	Generic	approach	and	flexibility	to	interconnection	is	preferred.	Still	some	
methods	that	can	be	considered	de	facto	can	be	stated	here.	With	this	requirement,	
we	tackle	most	of	the	possible	interconnection	needs.	
Requirement	4.1.1	REST	API	support	
System	should	implement	representational	state	transfer	(REST)	method	for	inter-
connection.	
Requirement	4.1.2	SOAP	API	support	
System	should	implement	simple	object	access	protocol	(SOAP)	method	for	intercon-
nection.	
Requirement	4.1.3	JavaScript	API	support	
System	should	implement	JavaScript	method	for	interconnection.	
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Requirement	4.2	Database	connectivity	
System	should	be	able	to	allow	connections	to	information	database.	Methods	de-
pend	on	the	type	of	database	that	is	selected	in	design	and	implementation	phase	so	
no	strict	definition	about	technology	can	be	made.	
Requirement	4.3	XMPP	message	support	
System	should	have	integration	possibility	to	chat	software	XMPP	protocol.	In	exer-
cises	chat	type	of	software	is	often	preferred	communication	method.	It	is	maybe	
slightly	outside	the	scope	of	this	thesis	but	there	should	be	automated	message	push	
according	to	keywords	or	tags	that	are	sent	into	SA	system.		
7.6 Data	processing	requirements	
The	amount	of	information	that	is	gathered,	reported	and	processed	in	cyber	secu-
rity	exercises	by	the	blue	team	is	vast	but	can’t	be	considered	as	a	big	data	or	data	
fusion	issue.	There	are	needs	to	aggregate,	normalize	and	process	the	data	so	that	it	
many	different	information	types	but	because	the	ultimate	goal	for	the	SA	system	is	
to	form	a	situation	awareness	about	the	exercise	and	events	in	this	context	and	at	
the	same	time	help	in	controlling	the	exercise	a	lot	of	information	is	human	inputted	
and	human	edited.	
This	means	that	straight	error	feeds	into	SA	system	are	not	preferred	approach.	The	
actual	data	fusion	of	for	example	network	traffic	should	be	done	in	some	other	sys-
tem.	If	such	a	system	is	monitoring	for	anomalies	or	for	known	threat	by	IOCs	there	
should	be	alerts.	The	findings	of	such	a	system	should	then	be	implemented	into	this	
SA	system	as	an	input	event.	
The	same	logic	applies	to	log	file	systems,	SIEM	systems,	IDS/IPS,	FW	and	other	sys-
tems	that	are	meant	to	be	used	by	operators	in	order	to	understand	situation	deeper	
from	certain	technological		
		
55	
Requirement	5.1	Database	implementation	
It	has	been	discussed	internally	in	JYVSECTEC	that	the	approach	into	this	system	and	
also	to	other	systems	used	in	exercise	control	shall	use	database	approach.	Other	al-
ternatives	like	wiki-systems	to	store	information	has	been	discussed	but	because	
other	development	projects	are	designed	with	databases	it	has	been	selected.	
Requirement	5.2	Automated	data	aggregation	
System	shall	have	data	aggregation	functionalities.	As	the	Requirement	1.2	Simplic-
ity	of	usage	and	Requirement	1.2.1	Information	input	field	maximum	are	limiting	
the	amount	of	information	user	has	to	input	there	is	need	to	add	data	to	events	gen-
erated.	Also	applies	to	the	requirements	relating	to	interconnection	requirements	
when	information	is	inputted	via	machine	interfaces.	
Requirement	5.2.1	Automatic	user	or	system	information	
System	shall	automatically	add	the	information	about	who	or	what	system	inputted	
information	so	that	it	will	be	presented	in	the	SA	information.	
Requirement	5.2.2	Automatic	timestamping	
System	shall	automatically	mark	timestamps	to	all	actions	made	into	information	but	
only	latest	modification	timestamp	should	be	changed.	All	other	timestamps	are	
stored	relating	to	action	done	so	that	when	reporting	there	will	be	automatically	
timeline	of	actions	done.	
Requirement	5.2.3	Automatic	relationships		
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System	shall	automatically	make	a	relationship	to	information	existing	in	the	SA	sys-
tem	database.	For	example,	previous	IOCs	are	linked	if	new	event	is	generated	hav-
ing	the	same	actionable	data.	This	requirement	has	relation	to	Requirement	1.2.9	
Automatic	event	change	indicator.	
		
57	
8 System	construction	
As	has	been	explained	in	earlier	chapters,	there	are	huge	amount	of	information	
sources	and	information	users.	Also,	as	was	stated	earlier	in	this	thesis,	the	situa-
tional	awareness	is	always	individual	and	should	lead	into	actions	via	decision	mak-
ing.	As	there	are	no	solutions	in	the	market	that	addresses	cyber	situation	awareness	
and	exercise	control	in	manner	that	is	described	earlier	this	thesis	a	solution	should	
be	developed.	
In	the	context	of	blue	team	situation	awareness	in	cyber	exercise	there	is	a	funda-
mental	need	for	a	new	construction	proposal	for	SA	system	that	not	only	helps	in	un-
derstanding	how	blue	team	forms	their	SA	but	also	helps	the	game	control	in	deliver-
ing	an	exercise	that	fulfills	learning	objectives	set.		
The	main	reason	for	the	lack	of	this	kind	of	novel	system	emerges	from	the	fact	that	
not	many	organizations	are	in	the	cyber	security	exercise	business.	Also,	quite	many	
times	the	exercises	are	either	table	top	exercises	or	some	form	of	competitions	that	
are	focusing	on	technical	things.	
JAMK	cyber	exercises	are	often	technical-operational	by	nature,	and	the	focus	is	on	
helping	teams	to	form	a	unified	situational	awareness	so	that	all	participants	have	
the	possibility	to	learn	and	build	their	individual	understanding	about	cyber	security	
incidents	and	how	to	handle	them.	
The	proposed	system	construction	in	Figure	9	derives	from	these	key	points	and	
shows	that	a	collective	SA	system	construction	can	be	formed,	and	that	existing	
cyber	security	solutions	cover	only	certain	technical	aspects.	
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Figure	9	Proposed	blue	team	situation	awareness	system	construction	
8.1 User	interface	
In	Figure	9	the	user	interface	part	is	illustrated	as	a	single	software	component	
where	the	visualization	of	information	and	input	modules	are	visible	to	the	users.	
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There	is	clear	difference	in	the	user	interface	for	blue	team	members	and	to	the	
white	team	members.	Because	white	team	members	are	only	using	the	system	in	or-
der	to	understand	the	situation	in	teams	the	input	mechanism	is	taken	out	to	make	
sure	that	no	white	team	members	are	involved	in	the	exercise	as	contributors	to	the	
situational	awareness	of	blue	team.	
One	should	also	realize	that	white	team	–	blue	team	members	only	see	the	situation	
in	team	related	to	them	but	game	master	has	access	to	all	teams.	This	is	to	illustrate	
that	there	can	be	such	a	selection	if	it	is	needed.	
From	blue	team	perspective	team	1	only	has	access	to	team	1	information	and	team	
2	only	has	access	to	team	2	information.	This	is	to	make	sure	that	teams	are	not	con-
structing	their	SA	relying	to	actions	taken	and	reported	by	other	teams.	The	objective	
is	to	learn	and	form	team	specific	understanding.	
8.2 Data	input	and	select	
This	construction	does	not	dictate	the	design	of	the	software	in	functional	block	level	
but	it	is	obvious	that	the	mechanism	in	inputting	information	differs	heavily	from	
data	select.	
Input	is	one-way	operation	to	the	system	and	handles	writing	new	events	via	event	
input	module.		
Data	select	is	two-way	communication	module.	This	means	that	select	module	han-
dles	the	information	requests	and	modification	done	via	visualization	module,	dash-
board	or	the	pane.	
8.3 Data	API	
Data	API	module	is	used	when	information	is	inputted	into	SA	system	from	outside	
sources.	These	modules	handle	most	of	the	interconnection	requirements.	The	appli-
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cation	modules	are	considered	as	one-way	so	that	SA	system	does	not	push	new	con-
figurations	to	the	data	source	systems.	The	exercise	members	in	blue	teams	have	to	
do	those	tasks	directly	to	security	and	control	systems	according	to	the	SA	and	this	
leads	to	the	loop	of	gaining	better	SA	via	the	system	as	has	been	presented	earlier	
according	to	situational	awareness	theory.	
8.4 Data	aggregation	
Data	aggregation	module	is	the	module	that	adds	information	to	events	and	makes	
the	relations.	This	means	that	data	aggregation	is	fundamentally	having	a	lot	of	auto-
mated	tasks	such	as	analyzing	input	and	making	database	requests	according	to	the	
information.	
Data	aggregation	needs	to	be	robust	and	there	is	need	to	focus	heavily	into	the	de-
sign	of	this	component.	If	this	component	is	not	working	properly	the	information	
presented	to	UI	is	lacking	vital	information	pieces	that	is	needed	in	forming	accurate	
SA.	
8.5 Database	
Database	module	consists	of	database	information	only	to	specific	teams	and	from	
information	presented	to	all	teams.	This	separation	is	needed	in	making	sure	that	
team	don’t	see	other	team	information	but	has	access	to	general	information	feed	
that	is	needed	in	forming	coherent	SA.	
Example	from	such	a	general	system	could	be	malware	information	sharing	platform	
(MISP)	that	is	used	by	teams	and	where	the	inputted	threat	intelligence	will	be	
shared	between	teams	according	to	the	sharing	rules	they	set.	
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9 Research	results	
This	thesis	was	assigned	because	in	JYVSECTEC	CENTER	(JYVSECTEC.	2017)	project	
the	need	for	research	and	development	in	the	area	of	situational	awareness	was	
identified	as	a	project	result.	The	scope	of	thesis	was	further	limited	to	specifically	in	
finding	requirements	for	blue	team	situational	awareness	system	in	cyber	security	
exercise.	
Initial	result	of	the	thesis	is	the	study	about	the	cyber	situational	awareness	system	
approaches.	The	realization	that	there	is	no	theoretical	research	done	for	team	situa-
tional	awareness	in	cyber	exercises	is	a	result	in	itself	and	makes	it	obvious	that	there	
is	still	a	lot	more	future	research	objectives	to	be	found.		
The	research	in	the	situational	awareness	field	is	mostly	focusing	on	either	the	tech-
nical	information	handling	dilemma	or	the	situational	awareness	for	CERT	and	CSIRT	
teams	in	national	level.	In	the	field	of	cyber	security	exercises	research	exists	but	the	
material	is	covering	mainly	the	aspects	on	how	to	instrument	and	conduct	such	an	
exercise	and	not	on	how	the	individuals	or	organizations	are	functioning	in	an	exer-
cise.		
The	main	result	of	this	thesis	is	the	identified	generic	requirements	mentioned	in	
chapter	7.	Requirements	in	this	thesis	fulfill	the	assignment,	cover	the	needed	basic	
functions	for	first	design	and	development	iteration	and	provide	as	such	a	solid	start-
ing	point	for	a	demonstration	system	software	project	for	blue	team	SA	system.	
There	is	a	total	of	56	individual	generic	requirements	listed	in	this	thesis.	The	require-
ments	are	listed	under	five	different	generic	sections	in	order	to	help	understand	the	
relevance	of	the	requirement	to	the	system.		
Usage	requirements	cover	generic	requirements	to	user	interface	and	data	input.	
Blue	team	section	covers	the	requirements	blue	team	has	so	that	they	are	able	to	
utilize	the	information	according	to	their	needs.	White	team	requirements	cover	the	
difference	from	blue	team	users.	Interconnectivity	covers	the	requirements	when	
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other	systems	are	connected	to	SA	system.	Data	processing	requirements	cover	data	
storage	and	data	processing	areas	of	the	SA	system.	
The	main	function	of	the	situational	awareness	system	is	that	the	blue	team	mem-
bers	are	able	to	form	individual	situational	awareness	and	at	the	same	time	form	
team	situational	awareness	about	the	events	they	have	reacted	to	in	cyber	exercise.	
Additionally,	from	user	point	of	view	the	system	shall	be	simple	to	use	and	at	the	
same	time	automatically	handles	the	reporting	function	to	exercise	management	so	
that	need	for	any	additional	system	is	eliminated.	
Novel	construction	according	to	the	requirements	is	another	major	result.	This	novel	
design	concept	framework	for	a	blue	team	situational	awareness	system	is	presented	
and	explained	in	chapter	8.	
The	system	construction	section	is	divided	into	5	areas.	First	the	user	interface	por-
tion	and	then	data	input	and	select	section	to	make	user	actions	functional.	Data	API	
is	facilitating	the	possible	interconnection	of	other	information	sources	to	the	SA	sys-
tem.	Data	aggregation	has	a	lot	of	the	vital	functions	on	how	the	system	is	actually	
operating	and	is	critical	component	in	the	proposed	construction	model.	The	last	
part	is	the	database	which	is	the	information	storage	for	this	blue	team	SA	system.	
These	results	fulfill	the	assignment	of	the	thesis	and	the	objectives	are	met.	Because	
there	is	no	research	done	specific	to	the	blue	team	SA	problematics	presented	in	this	
thesis	it	is	quite	obvious	that	the	requirement	list	is	not	complete.	There	is	not	
enough	actual	information	or	references	available	to	form	a	holistic	requirement	set.	
It	is	probable	that	some	requirements	will	be	altered,	new	requirements	added	or	
existing	ones	removed	in	the	design	and	development	phase.	It	is	totally	acceptable	
as	this	thesis	is	presenting	first	of	a	kind	construction	proposal.	
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10 Conclusions	
The	selected	constructive	research	method	was	used	throughout	the	thesis	process.	
The	initial	reasoning	was	that	because	this	method	is	well	suited	to	applied	sciences	
and	objective	of	thesis	was	to	construct	a	requirement	specification	it	is	well	suited	
for	this	task.	The	aim	for	novel	construction	was	kept	in	mind	throughout	the	whole	
thesis	process.		
After	starting	thesis,	the	first	stage	was	to	gather	reference	material.	By	examining	
the	materials	from	situational	awareness	and	cyber	security	exercises	field	it	became	
quite	obvious	that	at	the	moment	there	is	research	done	for	those	fields.	But	at	the	
same	time	there	are	only	limited	material	that	is	specifically	addressing	the	blue	
team	needs	and	none	that	combines	these.	
Choosing	constructive	research	method	meant	that	all	aspects	of	the	research	
method	could	not	be	fulfilled	in	this	thesis.	Constructive	research	by	definition	
should	have	practical	functioning	to	the	researched	field	of	expertise	but	limiting	the-
sis	to	requirements	meant	that	there	will	be	no	actual	functioning	solution	to	be	
tested.		
This	limitation	was	accepted	as	an	understandable	flaw	when	decision	for	a	research	
method	was	made	by	the	author.	Other	methods	were	examined	but	constructive	
method	suited	well	as	the	requirements	and	construction	itself	were	formed	during	
the	thesis	work	as	iterative	process.		
The	problem	with	functioning	solution	is	that	iterative	process	drives	into	building	on	
top	of	the	knowledge	and	understanding.	This	can	lead	into	lack	of	objectivity	and	it	
must	be	said	that	the	author	also	had	difficulties	in	critical	thinking	to	the	require-
ments	and	construction.	It	is	really	easy	to	just	think	that	you	understand	the	prob-
lem	from	many	aspects	and	be	unable	to	form	critical	challenges	to	self.	
The	assignment	of	the	thesis	was	to	find	and	generate	requirements	for	blue	team	
situational	awareness	system.	The	requirements	are	found	and	listed	with	definitions	
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which	means	that	this	thesis	can	be	used	as	a	baseline	document	for	design	and	im-
plementation	phase	in	software	project	aimed	at	producing	a	functional	situational	
awareness	system.	
This	thesis	offers	new	information	to	the	situational	awareness	research	in	cyber	ex-
ercise	context	and	provides	the	needed	requirements	to	the	organization	that	were	
the	objectives	of	this	work.	JYVSECTEC	project	goals	for	researching	situational	
awareness	are	also	enhanced	by	this	work	and	if	decision	is	made	to	develop	the	pro-
posed	system	the	participants	in	future	exercises	will	have	a	much	better	way	of	un-
derstanding	the	situation	and	actions	they	experience.	
The	research	presented	here	also	opens	future	research	possibilities	to	the	assignee	
organization	and	highlights	the	fact	that	even	though	there	are	a	lot	of	research	done	
in	the	cyber	exercise	area	and	in	the	situational	awareness	areas	there	are	many	as-
pects	that	are	not	studied	at	the	moment.		
Too	much	of	the	individual	and	organizational	situational	awareness	learning	process	
is	left	out	in	research	topics	at	the	moment	and	most	of	the	cyber	security	situational	
awareness	issues	are	considered	to	be	only	technical	data	processing	problems.	
A	lot	of	issues	in	situational	awareness	can	of	course	be	sorted	out	for	example	by	
automation,	data	fusion	and	anomaly	detection.	These	technical	and	mathematical	
approaches	are	vital	in	enhancing	the	big	data	problematics	of	cyber.	But	as	this	the-
sis	shows	it	is	ultimately	the	human	whose	situational	awareness	is	the	key	in	learn-
ing	situations.	This	aspect	needs	a	lot	more	research.		
By	making	a	system	which	helps	building	a	timeline	based	learning	diary	of	sorts	
would	help	human	to	reflect	his	or	hers’	actions	and	learn	from	them.	At	the	same	
time	sharing	this	information	to	exercise	control	will	make	sure	that	the	learning	ob-
jectives	can	be	fulfilled	properly.	
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This	thesis	also	benefitted	the	author	personally	in	many	ways.	The	assigned	topic	is	
interesting	and	valid	to	authors	daily	job	in	JYVSECTEC.	At	the	beginning,	there	was	a	
false	pretense	from	the	author	that	a	lot	of	the	needed	knowledge	is	already	gath-
ered	during	many	years	of	working	in	the	cyber	security	business	and	attending	to	
numerous	cyber	exercises.	The	further	the	thesis	work	advanced	the	more	there	
were	aspects	that	started	to	interest	more	and	at	the	same	time	it	became	obvious	
that	there	are	still	a	lot	of	aspects	that	the	author	is	looking	forward	to	studying	
more.	
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Appendices	
Appendix	1. Table	of	requirements	
Table	2	Requirements	for	a	SA	System	
ID	 Name	 Description	 Importance	 Action	 Type	of	Action	 Relation	
Usage	Requirements	
1.1	 Multiple	infor-mation	types	
System	shall	be	able	to	handle	differ-
ent	main	information	types	needed	in	
different	exercise	functions.		
Mandatory	 general	 		 		
1.1.1	 Information	type	Observation	
System	shall	be	able	to	handle	obser-
vation	type	of	information.	 Mandatory	 input	 textual	 		
1.1.2	 Information	type	Issue	
System	shall	be	able	to	handle	issue	
type	of	information.	 Mandatory	 input	 textual	 		
1.1.3	 Information	type	Incident	
System	shall	be	able	to	handle	incident	
type	of	information.	 Mandatory	 input	 textual	 		
1.2	 Simplicity	of	usage	
System	shall	be	easy	to	use	as	too	
complex	user	interfaces	can	push	exer-
cise	partici-pants	to	opt	out.	
Mandatory	 general	 		
5.2	Auto-
mated	data	
aggregation	
1.2.1	 Information	input	field	maximum	
There	should	be	a	maximum	of	eight	
fields	the	user	needs	to	input	in	order	
to	push	any	of	the	information	types	
into	SA	system.		
Important	 general	 		
5.2	Auto-
mated	data	
aggregation	
1.2.2	 No	separate	login	credentials	
System	shall	not	have	separate	login	
credentials.	This	is	crucial	because	the	
more	systems	exercise	participants	
have	to	sign	into,	the	more	of	them	are	
left	unused	
Mandatory	 general	 automatic	 		
1.2.3	 Single	sign-on	with	exercise	credentials	
Login	shall	be	automatically	imple-
mented	as	single	sign-on	function	into	
SA	at	the	same	time	when	an	exercise	
participant	is	logging	into	a	cyber	
range	machine.	
Mandatory	 general	 automatic	 		
1.2.4	
Automated	open-
ing	of	the	SA	sys-
tem	
The	user	shall	login	automatically	into	
SA	system.		 Mandatory	 general	 automatic	 		
1.2.5	
Input	form	accord-
ing	to	information	
type	
Human	input	system	shall	change	the	
information	fields	automatically	ac-
cording	to	user	selection	of	infor-
mation	type.	
Mandatory	 visual	 automatic	 		
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1.2.6	 IG-OOG	hybrid	structure	
There	shall	be	only	one	interface	for	
information	input.	The	information	can	
be	used	from	in-game	or	out-of-game	
perspectives.	
Mandatory	 general	 		 		
1.2.7	 Limited	amount	of	graphics	
The	user	interfaces	should	not	be	too	
graphical	in	nature.	The	simple	input	
field	application	with	limited	infor-
mation	is	preferred.	
Important	 visual	 		 		
1.2.8	 Dynamic	view	
The	user	shall	be	able	to	select	the	
parts	to	be	visible.	The	system	users	
need	to	form	individual	SA	so	the	view	
into	SA	system	needs	to	be	individually	
customizable.	
Mandatory	 visual	 automatic	 		
1.2.9	 Automatic	event	change	indicator	
The	system	shall	change	the	visual	
marking	in	system	when	event	is	
changed	some-how.		
Mandatory	 visual	 automatic	
5.2.3	Auto-
matic	rela-
tion	
Blue	team	user	requirements	
2.1	 Title	of	incident	
Users	of	the	system	shall	be	able	to	as-
sign	free	text	format	title	to	incident	so	
that	it	is	easily	identifiable	
Mandatory	 input	 textual	 		
2.1.1	 Search	of	incident	
Users	shall	be	able	to	search	for	exist-
ing	incidents	directly	from	the	title	
field.		
Mandatory	 input	 textual	or	numerical	 		
2.2	 Criticality	level	of	incident	
Users	of	the	system	shall	be	able	to	as-
sign	criticality	value	to	incident.	 Mandatory	 input	
textual	or	
numerical	 		
2.2.1	 Textual	level	of	in-cident	
Users	of	the	system	shall	be	able	to	as-
sign	textual	value	to	incident.	If	a	team	
is	using	written	criticality	values	they	
can	do	so.	
Mandatory	 input	 textual	 		
2.2.2	 Numerical	level	of	incident	
Users	of	the	system	shall	be	able	to	as-
sign	numerical	value	to	incident.	If	a	
team	is	using	numbers	for	criticality	
they	can	do	so.	
Mandatory	 input	 numerical	 		
2.2.3	 Change	the	critical-ity	level	of	incident	
Users	of	the	system	shall	be	able	to	
change	the	criticality	of	incident	ac-
cording	to	their	needs.	Incidents	
change	their	criticality	when	they	are	
investigated.	
Mandatory	 input	 textual	or	numerical	 		
2.3	 Assignment	of	inci-dent	
Users	shall	be	able	to	assign	individuals	
to	be	responsible	in	handling	incidents	
in	team.	
Mandatory	 input	 textual	 		
2.3.1	 Change	assignment	
Users	shall	be	able	to	change	assign-
ment	of	incident	according	to	their	
needs.	Many	individuals	might	take	
part	in	handling	incidents	
Mandatory	 input	 textual	 		
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2.4	 State	of	the	inci-dent	
Users	shall	be	able	to	assign	state	to	
incidents.	 Mandatory	 input	 textual	 		
2.4.1	 Change	the	state	of	the	incident	
Users	shall	be	able	to	change	state	of	
incidents.		 Mandatory	 input	 textual	 		
2.5	 Incident	descrip-tion	input	
Users	shall	be	able	to	use	free	text	
field	in	describing	what	they	are	doing.	 Mandatory	 input	 textual	 		
2.6	 Actionable	data	in-put	
Users	shall	be	able	to	use	free	text	
field	in	describing	what	they	define	as	
actionable	data.	
Mandatory	 input	 textual	or	numerical	 		
2.7	 Tagging	of	events	 Users	shall	be	able	to	assign	free	text	tags	to	events.	 Mandatory	 input	
textual	or	
numerical	 		
2.8	 Relationship	of	events	
Users	shall	be	able	to	assign	relation-
ships	to	events	if	they	know	any.	 Mandatory	 input	 textual	 		
2.9	 Timeline	of	events	 Users	shall	be	able	to	see	events	of	in-terest	in	a	graphical	timeline.	 Mandatory	 visual	 		 		
2.9.1	 Selection	of	events	to	timeline	
Users	shall	be	able	to	filter	and	select	
events	and	modification	points	to	
events	as	they	wish	in	timeline	
Mandatory	 visual	 		 		
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2.9.2	 Information	input	from	timeline	
Users	shall	be	able	to	alter	the	infor-
mation	directly	from	timeline	 Mandatory	 input	
textual	or	
numerical	 		
2.9.3	 Dynamic	timeline	
Timeline	should	be	dynamic	and	pre-
sented	information	should	change	au-
tomatically	when	alterations	to	display	
parameters	are	issued	by	the	user.	
Important	 visual	 automatic	 		
2.9.4	 Individual	timeline	
Timelines	should	be	individual	as	each	
person	has	their	own	needs	for	infor-
mation	to	form	individual	SA.	If	person	
changes	display	parameters	it	affects	
to	personal	timeline	only.	
Important	 visual	 automatic	 		
2.9.5	 Shareable	timeline	
Timelines	should	be	shareable	as	per-
sons	might	want	to	share	their	views	
to	a	data	in	order	to	form	similar	SA	
from	information	selected.	
Important	 visual	 automatic	 		
2.10	 Event	pane	
Events	shall	be	presented	in	an	event	
pane	as	persons	might	be	accustomed	
to	seeing	data	in	traditional	formats.	
Mandatory	 visual	 automatic	 		
2.10.1	 Searchable	event	pane	
Events	should	be	freely	searchable	by	
regular	expressions	or	free	text.	 Important	 input	
textual	or	
numerical	 		
2.10.2	 Selectable	event	pane	
Events	should	be	freely	selectable	by	
fields	visible	in	pane.	 Important	 visual	 automatic	 		
2.11	 Event	dashboard	
Events	shall	be	presented	in	selectable	
dashboard	views	as	persons	might	be	
ac-customed	to	seeing	data	in	tradi-
tional	formats	
Mandatory	 visual	 automatic	 		
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2.11.1	 Pie-chart	dash-board	
Event	pane	information	should	be	
viewable	in	pie-chart	format.	 Important	 visual	 automatic	 		
2.11.2	 Key-value	pair	chart	
Selected	event	pane	information	
should	be	viewable	in	key-value	pair	
chart.	
Important	 visual	 automatic	 		
White	team	user	requirements	
3.1	
Visualize	multiple	
blue	team	infor-
mation	
System	shall	be	able	to	visualize	multi-
ple	blue	teams’	information	in	single	
views.		
Mandatory	 visual	 automatic	 		
3.2	 Multiple	team	se-lection	
White	team	shall	be	able	to	select	in-
formation	from	multiple	blue	teams.	 Mandatory	 input	 textual	 		
3.2.1	 Team	selection	in	pane	
White	team	shall	have	additional	team	
information	in	event	pane.	 Mandatory	 input	 textual	 		
3.2.2	 Team	selection	in	dashboards	
White	team	shall	have	additional	team	
information	selection	in	dashboards.	 Mandatory	 input	 textual	 		
3.2.3	 Team	selection	in	timeline	
White	team	shall	have	additional	team	
information	selection	in	timeline.	 Mandatory	 input	 textual	 		
Interconnectivity	requirements	
4.1	 Multiple	API	sup-port	
System	shall	accept	different	methods	
in	connection	to	other	computer	sys-
tems	and	services.	
Mandatory	 general	 automatic	 		
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4.1.1	 REST	API	support	
System	should	implement	representa-
tional	state	transfer	(REST)	method	for	
inter-connection.	
Important	 general	 automatic	 		
4.1.2	 SOAP	API	support	
System	should	implement	simple	ob-
ject	access	protocol	(SOAP)	method	for	
inter-connection.	
Important	 general	 automatic	 		
4.1.3	 JavaScript	API	sup-port	
System	should	implement	JavaScript	
method	for	interconnection.	 Important	 general	 automatic	 		
4.2	 Database	connec-tivity	
System	should	be	able	to	allow	con-
nections	to	information	database	 Important	 general	 automatic	 		
4.3	 XMPP	message		
System	should	have	integration	possi-
bility	to	chat	software	XMPP	protocol.	
In	exercises	chat	type	of	software	is	of-
ten	preferred	communication	method	
Important	 general	 automatic	 		
Data	processing	requirements	
5.1	 Database	imple-mentation	
It	has	been	discussed	internally	in	
JYVSECTEC	that	the	approach	into	this	
system	and	also	to	other	systems	used	
in	exercise	control	shall	use	database	
approach.	
Mandatory	 general	 automatic	 		
5.2	 Automated	data	aggregation	
System	shall	have	data	aggregation	
functionalities	 Mandatory	 general	 automatic	
1.2	Simplic-
ity	of	usage,	
1.2.1	Infor-
mation	input	
field	maxi-
mum		
5.2.1	 Automatic	user	or	system	information	
System	shall	automatically	add	the	in-
formation	about	who	or	what	system	
inputted	information	so	that	it	will	be	
presented	in	the	SA	information.	
Mandatory	 general	 automatic	 		
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5.2.2	 Automatic	timestamping	
System	shall	automatically	mark	
timestamps	to	all	actions	made	into	in-
formation	but	only	latest	modification	
timestamp	should	be	changed.	
Mandatory	 general	 automatic	 		
5.2.3	 Automatic	relation-ships		
System	shall	automatically	make	a	re-
lationship	to	information	existing	in	
the	SA	system	database.	
Mandatory	 general	 automatic	
1.2.9	Auto-
matic	event	
change	indi-
cator	
	
